Source: Extract from The Royal Naval Medical Service Vol II, JLS Coulter
Medical
Organisation Ashore in North Russia
Towards the Of 1941, a small
Royal Naval base had been established at Kola Inlet by a party
consisting of 12 officers and 38 ratings, who made the journey to
Murmansk in two submarines. As part of this local British naval
shore organisation, there were two sick bays each in the care of a
sick berth attendant. At this time, when enemy attacks on the convoy
route had not yet got into their stride, the reception of British
patients into hospitals in Murmansk was described as adequate and
the attitude of the local Medical Authorities as very helpful.
At Polyarnoe, the headquarters of
the British Naval Base, the local hospital, though now serving the
U.S.S.R. Northern Fleet, and though equipped with 350 beds,
possessed accommodation of a somewhat simple nature. Though regarded
by the Russians as a general hospital designed for all purposes, it
appeared really to be more of a casualty clearing station and
nothing more than might have been expected at a small and normally
unfrequented port in this remote part of Lapland in time of peace.
The absence of adequate sanitation and washing facilities, the lack
of privacy, the overcrowding, and the absence of segregation of
clean and septic cases caused a most unfavourable impression among
naval patients who were admitted to this hospital.
These reports were confirmed by several naval medical officers who
visited it, one of whom recorded:
'On entering the place, I was
assailed with a strong smell which necessitated the smoking of a
cigarette, and I was forced to put on a white gown which might well
have been used for cleaning the windows. The sanitation was shocking
with grossly inadequate lavatory accommodation.
'The operating theatre was 36 ft.
X 15 ft., but it contained no sink and there were no facilities for
scrubbing up.
'There were three surgeons
operating at the time at three wooden operating tables. On the first
of these a negro was having radiant heat treatment for frost‑bitten
feet. On the second a blood transfusion was being given to a Russian
soldier who had a compound fracture of the thigh. On the third table
a supra‑pubic cystotomy was in progress.'
Another report reads :
'There is one surgical ward into
which clean and dirty cases are received indiscriminately. It is
very overcrowded and there is no ventilation as all the windows are
permanently boarded up.
'The food supplied is quite
unsuitable for British personnel who are seriously ill, the routine
diet being:
7 a.m. Tea, bread and butter.
12 a.m. Rice or macaroni soup, fruit juice, bread and butter.
6 p.m. Rice or macaroni soup, raw fish, bread and butter, coffee.
8 p.m. Tea, bread and butter.'
Of the same hospital another
report noted that
'The hospital itself is far from
clean, the wards are very large, accommodating between 50 and 60
beds which are crowded close together.
'A constant noise goes on from a
radio, mostly broadcasting propaganda talks, while each day a
talking war film, usually horrific in type, is exhibited in every
ward.'
Nevertheless, a number of reports do record other matters of
interest which were of credit to the local Russian medical
administration. In particular, mention is made of the fact that at
this time the Russians had their hands full in dealing with their
own casualties. But, in spite of this, there were many occasions
when British patients were given preferential treatment. For
example, one naval medical officer who landed Russian and British
casualties from his ship after a convoy battle wrote:
'The British naval survivors were
admitted at once, and the largest ward was put at my disposal. The
Russian survivors were laid on stretchers in the corridors outside.'
It
has also been recorded that the Russian doctors were helpful and
competent within the limits of their supplies, the latter always
being short. It seems too that at the Russian nursing staff,
although badly trained and inexperienced, particularly in dealing
with wounds, were at least willing and sympathetic.
Meanwhile, at this early stage, the British naval medical
organisation ashore was not above reproach. There was a small Royal
Naval sick bay at Polyarnoe but it lacked equipment and could only
deal with minor cases. For medical stores it was, at this time,
dependent on what it could obtain from visiting men‑of‑war. Its
accommodation consisted of one large room containing twenty beds,
and a smaller room for dispensing and for keeping stores. It was
staffed by one naval medical officer and one sick berth
attendant.
This small sick bay had to serve the needs of 25 naval officers and
78 naval ratings by mid 1942. These persons were scattered over a
wide area locally, being based on Vaenga 9 miles away, Grayaznaya 13
miles, and Murmansk 23 miles distant. The mileage in each case is
that of water transport. In addition provision had to be made for
the needs of survivors landed locally after convoy battles. These
numbered as many as 8oo at one time, and they were accommodated in
camps at Vaenga and Grayaznaya.
Up
to mid 1942, the local accommodation of British survivors and
casualties after the convoy battles had become progressively more
difficult, and during the fourteen weeks prior to the end of July,
54 wounded had been landed at Kola from a cruiser, 35 from a
destroyer, while other batches of survivors had numbered 47, 35 and
33, most of them belonging to the Merchant Navy.
As regards Vaenga and Grayaznaya,
to which reference has already been made above, local hospital
resources were essentially improvised and only intended as an
overflow from those of Murmansk and Polyarnoe. At Vaenga the
hospital was in the lower floor of a barracks, and at Grayaznaya a
school was used. But in spite of their difficulties and limitations,
both these hospitals contrived to care for British cases, and both
received wounded from HMS Gossamer at the end June 1942.
At
Murmansk itself, some 30 miles up the Kola Inlet, a Royal Naval
medical officer acted as base medical officer. The only hospital
available for British wounded was a former school in which the
Russians had accommodated 400 beds.
This hospital had the added disadvantage of unsuitable buildings
superimposed upon the usual limitations of all the regular hospitals
in the vicinity. Among these limitations were a lack of
sulphonamides, a scarcity of plaster, narcotics and antiseptics and
a complete absence of inhalation or intravenous anaesthetics. The
only type of anaesthesia available was novocaine. Sanitary provision
was inadequate and the hospital suffered badly from an absence of
lifts.
Nevertheless, until it had to be evacuated on account of intensive
bombing, this hospital did useful work, and many of its obvious
disadvantages were overcome by international goodwill. When wounded
from H.M. destroyers Foresight and Forester were
admitted on May 3, 1942, everything possible was done for them.
Also, permission was given for medical officers of these ships to
visit the hospital and attend to their own cases, and to use their
own medical supplies which they brought ashore with them.
Although the nursing sisters of this hospital were well trained,
competent and hard working, there was a great scarcity of them and
the nursing was chiefly done by women of little experience. Nearly
every surgical case became septic. The Russian wards were
desperately crowded, and every available passage, hall or corridor
was filled with beds, or with cases still on stretchers waiting for
a bed to become vacant. It was not uncommon to see two Russian
casualties sharing a single bed between them. Bedpans were scarce,
urine bottles were non‑existent, their place being taken by tobacco
tins.
The Medical Officer of H.M.S. Forester, who made these
observations, had many more opportunities to become familiar with
Murmansk and with the difficulties under which this particular
hospital was working. Therefore, for the purposes of this History,
it is considered that his remarks carry more weight and authority
than those adverse reports made by numerous other naval officers,
both medical and executive, whose visits were briefer.
The Medical Officer of H.M.S. Forester recorded:
'On admission every patient was
put through a regular routine. The wounded were collected in a
casualty room on the ground floor, where their names and numbers
were taken. Every patient, no matter from what he was suffering, was
then stripped in preparation for a shower‑bath which was given with
the greatest energy and diligence by a nurse. The patients were then
seen by two admitting medical officers, one of whom was a woman
whose duty was to make a rapid preliminary examination and
diagnosis, wounds, fractures or suspected fractures had X‑rays taken
at once before being sent off to the operating theatres or fracture
wards. The whole system seemed to work very smoothly and a large
number of patients was got through in quite a short time.'
This Medical Officer remarked that local travelling in Murmansk was
extremely difficult there being no buses and no dependable train
service. Motor cars were all state owned and only available for
official business of high priority. The Medical Officer found that
the only modes of transport between Kola Inlet and the hospital in
Murmansk were by steamer, walking or 'hitch‑hiking'. By one of these
methods he contrived to arrive at the hospital by 0900 hours daily,
ending his journey with a 'seemingly endless walk uphill against
biting wind and driving snow'. He then did a round of patients and
decided which were in need of special attention. He then set to work
on dressings which he continued doing each day until approximately
1800 hours. The only place where he could get food was the British
Mission, which he had to reach on foot a mile and a quarter away.
This Medical Officer assessed the position at that time very fairly
when he wrote:
'Everything in the hospital is
less than twenty years old, but is as yet only partly completed. It
is therefore impossible to form a true judgment on anything one
sees. The future only can tell what will happen or how development
will proceed. Everyone seems happy and very confident and hopeful as
to the outcome of the war. There is a desperate shortage of
instruments and anaesthetics and medical supplies. But in spite of
this the Russians give us of their best, and our patients receive
preferential treatment over their own wounded.'
This measured estimate is of particular value since it was written
at a time when daily air raids on Murmansk were being intensified
and conditions were such as to magnify any causes for criticism.
One of the great difficulties encountered in preparing this
particular section of this History has been to give a fair and
accurate report of the attitude of the Russian medical authorities
in their hospitals at this time. This task has been far from easy,
and the many official reports which have been studied in the Medical
Department of the Admiralty, and which cover the particular period,
have had to be sifted with very great care. For example, one naval
medical officer recorded that:
'Conditions were appalling in the
hospitals of Murmansk, and British naval patients were taken
completely out of the control of their own medical officer. The food
consisted entirely of black bread, which caused patients to develop
a chronic diarrhoea'
In point of fact investigation of
this statement showed that the medical
officer himself had never visited any of the hospitals, and that his
report, though made in good faith, had been founded on what had been
told him by other people with whom he had talked.
Apart from false impressions due
to hearsay evidence, other factors tended to cause divergencies in
the reports which were made. These factors included the frame of
mind of the writer who had either been subjected to the ordeal of
the northern convoy battle, or else had spent months of monotony and
boredom in a community whose language and culture he was unable to
share. Other variable factors which influenced the reports were the
degree and effectiveness of enemy air attack which at one time
almost paralysed the life of Murmansk. There were also periods of
great activity on the North Russian front, when casualties would
arrive in Murmansk faster than the hospitals could deal with them.
It was during such a period as this that the Medical Officer of
H.M.S. Eclipse landed British casualties from his own ship
and transported them to one of the Murmansk hospitals. He
wrote:
'The arrangements for the
transport of my patients to hospital were excellent. Three
ambulances arrived within ten minutes, and I was pleased to notice
that there were two medical officers with them. I went to the
hospital with my casualties, and during the short time at my
disposal I found that the arrangements, in all respects, appeared
very satisfactory indeed. There were numerous surgeons in
attendance. I noticed that nobody was allowed inside a ward unless
wearing a clean white gown.
'Unfortunately, owing to the
movements of my ship, I was unable to stay and watch the surgeons
operate on my cases. However, the naval base medical officer was in
attendance.
'But I had one other opportunity
to visit the hospital, and I found that the treatment given seemed
good and that my patients were quite satisfied. My own sick berth
attendant was a patient and, that day, had complained of a sore
throat. Immediately the Russian throat specialist for the Northern
Area had been sent for in consultation.
'My only complaints were that the
beds seemed rather close together and the food was far below our
standard. But I talked to some 60 survivors from British merchant
ships who said that they were well looked after and were pleased
with the attention which they had received. Their chief difficulty
was lack of interpreters.'
In
similar circumstances, after landing casualties, the Medical Officer
of H.M.S. Niger recorded:
'I found the staffs of the
hospitals at Polyarnoe and Murmansk most anxious to help and ready
to go to extreme lengths to carry out any of my suggestions with
regard to the treatment of British patients.'
In
contrast to the many favourable reports made on Russian hospitals in
the area around Kola Inlet, the corresponding reports of the medical
and surgical facilities in the Archangel area seem to have been
generally adverse.
Archangel was not regarded as an
agreeable place in which to arrive after running the gauntlet of the
Arctic Convoy route. To the all pervading smell of sewage was added,
in summer, the annoyance of mosquitoes and other biting insects,
while bed‑bugs were a perpetual source of complaint.
The countryside was
uninteresting, consisting of pine forests as far as the horizon, and
the custom of constructing houses, roads and wharves of unpainted
wood made for a drab environment which the local dress of the people
did nothing to relieve.
Transport from the various
jetties where our ships lay was at all times difficult, and such
medical organisation as did exist ashore was not always easy to
discover, because so often all the available interpreters were
engaged elsewhere.
In
the early months of 1942, the position of a naval medical
officer arriving at Archangel with wounded was not enviable. One
medical officer recorded:
'There is a complete lack of
organisation and even interest in medical affairs. No information is
available regarding hospital or dental facilities. A Captain R.A.M.C
. does his best to deal with naval cases, but there is no liaison
with the Russians.'
A naval medical organisation
ashore had in fact been improvised at from its very nature it was
ineffectual, since it consisted this time, of installing at the
small local Royal Naval Base a medical officer from one of the ships
due to return to the United Kingdom, or a surviving medical officer
from some ship which had been lost, who was awaiting passage home in
due course. These medical officers were never there long enough to
get their bearings, and the constant change of doctor did little
towards establishing a sound understanding with the local medical
authorities. There was a great need for a permanent naval base
medical officer, and also for a small sick quarters of some kind for
the reception of British patients.
Archangel itself was ill‑prepared for the strain which was to be
placed upon its resources, and which would have proved exacting even
to a highly organised community provided with modern amenities.
These latter were completely absent, and one report reads:
'The sanitary conditions of this
town are almost unbelievably bad, sewage lying in open cesspools.
Few forms of water closet exist, and public lavatories consist of a
small shed where the needs of humanity are simply relieved on the
floor. It the same even in some of the houses where a special room
is set aside as a lavatory with no plumbing arrangements at all.'
Crude untreated sewage from the town was discharged into the river
from which the water supply was drawn and, though naval medical
officers gave instructions for the boiling of all drinking water
used by sailors, this, when combined with the millions of flies, was
probably the cause of a severe outbreak of enteritis which
complicated the already difficult local medical problems.
The local Russian hospitals did
their best for British sick, but their beds were crowded and they
suffered from severe lack of supplies. Absence of anaesthetics and
occasional lack of skill is regarded as having been responsible for
much suffering among patients, especially where burns and fractures
were combined. Regarding the unsuccessful attempt of a Russian
hospital to reduce the fracture of a naval rating also suffering
from burns, a naval medical officer recorded:
'Throughout the entire operation
the patient was conscious and suffered acutely. The next day he was
extremely ill and the affected areas were obviously septic. Three
times in the next fortnight his plaster was altered, and finally
abandoned. His pulse was irregular and weak and his temperature
soaring. By this time his condition was extremely grave, he was
emaciated, unable to digest food and covered in bed sores.'
If the strain on local resources
at Archangel was already great in the early months of 1942,
the demands which arose in July of that year following the arrival
of survivors from Convoy P.Q. 17 were incalculably more
exacting. Reference has already been made to the Russian aspects of
the situation, but the local British medical organisation must now
be considered in greater detail.
The medical facilities ashore at this time were the nucleus of what
had originally been a British Army Field Ambulance Unit for 18 beds,
but from which the major in charge and his nursing orderlies had
since been withdrawn. This left the following:
1
Captain R.A.M.C.,
1 Sergeant Dispenser,
1 Corporal R.A.M.C.,
1 Lance‑corporal,
2 Orderlies,
1 Cook R.A.M.C.,
1 Plumber/ Carpenter
A
Sanitary Assistant and a Disinfector Operator were also available
from the local detachment of the Royal Pioneer Corps.
This small number of army men,
together with such naval medical officers and sick berth staff as
might be available, was confronted with a task on the arrival of
Convoy P.Q.17 which was so enormous as to become almost
chaotic. The senior naval medical officer present, who had
historical leanings, described the medical situation ashore as only
comparable with that at Dover during the days of the Dunkirk
evacuation. But he pointed out that, though at Dover there had
existed all the resources of British hospitals and transport, at
Archangel there were only the heavily strained local Russian medical
facilities which could not meet a huge commitment. Every hospital,
school and adaptable building was already occupied by Russian
casualties who were being nursed under conditions which, this
medical officer considered, resembled those at Scutari during the
Crimean War.
The equipment of the army personnel consisted chiefly of consumable
stores most of which at this time had already been used. The unit
maintained and manned two medical inspection rooms at nearby ports,
and it was responsible for the medical care of a total of 90 Royal
Navy, Army and R.A.F. personnel scattered throughout the district.
It
will be remembered that Convoy P.Q.17, in July 1942, had originally
consisted of 35 ships, of which only 11 completed the voyage safely.
Under the threat of attack by German surface vessels, this convoy
had split up, and the surviving ships were stragglers which made
their way to Archangel largely independently and unescorted.
During the first week in which these ships arrived, the total of
survivors landed at Archangel reached 1,245, of whom 688 were
British and Dutch, and 557 American. They included 179 cases of
immersion foot.
These ships staggered into port at indefinite times, and could send
no signals stating the number of cases to be catered for. Although
many of the survivors landed were uninjured, about 90 per cent of
them developed complaints of some kind or other. For the hospital
cases such arrangements as were possible were made by the Medical
Officer of the Rescue Ship Zaafaran, himself a survivor, who was
temporarily appointed Base Medical Officer, Archangel, on landing.
In
preparation for the first batch of survivors, Sevroless Hospital had
been made into a hostel with two wards left for the sick. This
hospital offered little comfort. Not only was there the usual
absence of adequate sanitary provision, but the presence of sick
aggravated this lack of hygiene. Soap was very scarce, and the
atmosphere soon became one in which were mingled the odours of
cooking, smoke, gangrene and stale urine. Beds were small, with
mattresses and linen of poor quality.
British survivors remained in this hospital for only two weeks. The
fit were then accommodated in a large school building, and the sick
were transferred to Military Hospital No. 2524. Sanitation in the
school building was difficult owing to lack, of water pressure,
which prevented the flow any water above the level of the ground
floor.
As more survivors arrived, they
were accommodated in the upper two floors of the Intourist Hotel
which had previously been a Russian military hospital. Bedding in
this building was provided by the Russian Authorities. This batch of
survivors arrived, exhausted, in the late evening. The following
morning it was apparent that there was a gross infestation by
bed‑bugs, and every man had been severely bitten without exception.
The rooms were cleared and the bedding condemned. The iron bedsteads
were scrubbed and all possible crevices were stoved with burning
newspaper.
As these and many other obstacles
were overcome, it was possible for the base medical officer to
organise a more regular routine and to hold definite hours for
visiting buildings in which survivors were accommodated. These
buildings included schools and General, Mental, Fever and Skin
Hospitals. These centres of accommodation varied chiefly as regards
the extent to which deficiencies were admitted and help offered. In
course of time, as survivors accumulated, they became widely
distributed. Meanwhile, further survivors landed at Murmansk were
evacuated to Archangel as a result of the increasing enemy air
attacks against the former port.
The problems of ministering to
the medical needs of this widely dispersed community were aggravated
by lack of transport. The base medical officer had to contrive to
keep an accurate record of his elusive patients. He had to maintain
liaison with many Russian medical staffs and to attempt to influence
them when their treatment was not in accordance with accepted
British practice or caused discontent among British patients. He had
to hold consultations with other naval medical officers, and he had
to arrange for his stores to be dispersed owing to enemy air raids.
One of his most difficult tasks was that of assuming responsibility
for the medical care of British ships at anchor in the harbour. Here
the chief impediment was concerned with the rigid Russian civil and
political administration locally. In one of his reports he has
recorded:
'A visit to a ship meant
arranging transport to her in a Russian launch. To do this through
an interpreter, and to obtain the necessary permit to visit the ship
usually occupied a whole forenoon. It was a complicated procedure,
as every American and British merchant ship was guarded by a Russian
sentry. Despite the fact that I was a British naval doctor I was
unable to proceed on board any British ship without a special pass
from the Customs Office, and my pass had to be renewed every day.'
In the midst of these activities
an epidemic of enteritis broke out locally which was acute although
its course was brief. The cases were shocked, collapsed and
incontinent, and the position was aggravated by them being scattered
in so many buildings in circumstances in which dieting, nursing and
sanitation were almost impossible.
By now it was more than obvious
that the medical situation ashore in Archangel merited an adequate
British hospital unit locally, and representations to this effect
were made to the Senior Base Naval Officer, Archangel.
Signals to this effect were made
to the Admiralty in London and to the Ministry of War Transport,
while at the same time a similar approach was made to the Russian
Government through diplomatic channels in Moscow. But, in spite of
these representations, by the time of the arrival of Convoy P.Q.18,
in September 1942, following a severe period of action at sea, no
further result had been achieved.
It had been known that Convoy
P.Q.18 would be involved in heavy enemy opposition during its
passage to Archangel in September 1942, and heavy casualties were
anticipated. With this contingency in view, a medical officer and 8
sick berth ratings, with stores and equipment, were sent to
Archangel during August in H.M.Ss. Blankney and Middleton. On August
29, these personnel and stores were still embarked at Archangel and
had not been permitted to land. On September 12, the British
Ambassador in Moscow was refused permission, by the Russian
Government, for the disembarkation of this hospital unit. On
September 14, permission was given for the stores and equipment to
be landed, but the personnel had to be transferred to H.M.S.
Palomares, on September 14, and returned to the United Kingdom.
Fortunately the medical officers of the naval escort of P.Q.18 were
able to arrange for survivors and casualties to be cared for afloat,
and to be nursed somehow until arriving back at Scapa Flow.
Thus the year 1942 closed at
Archangel without any change in the position which had provoked such
criticism among wounded and survivors from the Arctic Convoys.
At this point, it is of some
interest to view the medical organisation and facilities at Murmansk
and Archangel through the eyes of the Admiralty in London. By July
1942 the British Naval Authorities ashore in North Russia had become
firmly aware of the need for some form of established British
Service Hospital for the reception and treatment of casualties and
survivors from the convoys. Their complaints of what appeared to
them to be Admiralty procrastination are more than reflected in
their numerous official reports. But these local authorities in
North Russia were not aware of the many conflicting reports which
the Admiralty had received up to this time, and which, combined with
the repeated difficulties at diplomatic level which accrued during
the remainder of the year, build up an administrative chain of
events which is somewhat bewildering to follow in sequence.
To begin with, during the winter
of 1941‑2, in response to urgent appeals, the Admiralty had already
sent two medical officers for duty ashore in North Russia. These
medical officers had promptly been returned to the United Kingdom on
the grounds that there was insufficient work ashore to occupy them.
In February 1942, the Admiralty
had been officially informed that the combined medical work at
Archangel was insufficient to occupy the time of more than one naval
medical officer ashore. This report also commented favourably upon
local hospital accommodation and treatment.
In May 1942, the Senior Naval
Officer, North Russia, requested either a hospital unit ashore or a
hospital ship, but failed to indicate where he required either to
be. In response to this request, the Admiralty immediately arranged
to dispatch 4 medical officers and 31 sick berth staff as a hospital
unit, and at the same time asked whether this unit was required for
duty at Kola Inlet or at Archangel. On June 7, the Senior Naval
Officer, North Russia, indicated the need for the unit at Archangel,
but on June 11 he signalled to Admiralty that the personnel for the
unit were not necessary, and that local Russian hospital resources
were adequate for British requirements, provided instruments and
medicines could be supplemented.
Meanwhile, the position ashore at
Kola Inlet remained vague so, on June 15 the Admiralty asked whether
a hospital unit was required at Murmansk. In his reply, on June 16,
the Senior Naval Officer, North Russia, stated that this was not the
case but that he wanted one at Archangel. A further signal from
Archangel, on June 19 requested a medical officer ashore, but no
medical stores or equipment!
In view of this confusing series
of communications, the Admiralty in London can hardly be blamed for
abandoning its plans and preparations to send the personnel and
stores for a hospital unit in North Russia at this particular time.
The whole project seems now to
have remained in abeyance until July 30, on which date the
Commander‑in‑Chief of the Home Fleet expressed his great concern on
the reports of the wounded reaching him from Russia. The Admiralty
shared his anxiety, and simultaneously the Senior Naval Officer,
North Russia, asked for a hospital unit to be sent to Polyarnoe, in
a signal dated August 1.
On August 17, the medical stores
and equipment, so long assembled and so much needed, and the equally
long anticipated medical staff were embarked in the U.S. cruiser
Tuscaloosa; 4 medical officers, a dental officer and a warrant
wardmaster took passage, and some 30 sick berth ratings were
provided, in miscellaneous ships, for duty in North Russia by the
end of this month. It was now the intention that this medical party
should establish a Royal Naval Auxiliary Hospital at Vaenga Bay, an
anchorage on the east of the Kola Inlet which was much used by H.M.
ships.
The unit arrived at Kola Inlet on
August 23, 1942. But immediately the divergent needs and alternating
periods of activity between the Murmansk and Archangel
administrations were revealed.
The Senior Naval Officer, North
Russia, decided to send two‑thirds of the unit to Archangel at once,
keeping the remainder for duty at Vaenga. The two‑thirds of the unit
arrived at Archangel but was never permitted to land, the result
being that the unit returned to England forthwith, thus depleting
the needs of Murmansk without any benefit to Archangel.
Meanwhile, the residual one‑third
of the unit which had remained behind at Kola Inlet, continued its
preparations to set up a naval auxiliary hospital at Vaenga Bay. But
on September 21, the Commander-in‑Chief of the Soviet Northern Fleet
received orders from Moscow that the arrangements for this hospital
were suspended and that the unit was to be returned to England in
Convoy Q.P.15.. Steps were taken to implement these instructions to
withdraw, but on September 25, negotiations for the retention of
this hospital were reopened at diplomatic level. These negotiations
continued until October 2, when the Russian Government gave
permission for 'a certain number of British medical collaborators'
to work in Soviet hospitals, but refused permission for a separate
British Service medical establishment to be set up on shore.
The Admiralty now decided to
provision, staff and equip one of the Arctic Convoy rescue ships as
a small hospital ship, for permanent service as base hospital at
Kola Inlet. But barely had this project been raised when, on October
5, the Russian Government approved the establishment of a Royal
Naval Auxiliary Hospital ashore at Vaenga Bay. There were hopes of a
similar hospital at Archangel, the need for such an establishment
being beyond dispute. However, protracted negotiations met with no
success in the case of this port.
