SECRET
Attention is drawn to the penalties attaching to any infraction of the Official Secrets Acts.

C.B. 34234 (44) (16)

DECEMBER, 1944

ADMIRALTY CONVOY INSTRUCTIONS
TO ESCORTS

(Short Title – “A.C.I.”)

NORTH RUSSIAN CONVOY SECTION

The enclosed North Russian Convoy Instructions are issued for the
information and guidance of all concerned.

Henry Moore
Admiral

SECTION A

OPERATION – SURFACE ESCORTS

Article 9000

General Information on Russian Convoys

Convoys from United Kingdom to North Russia are at present known as J.W. convoys, and those from North Russia to the United Kingdom as R.A. convoys. These short titles are changed periodically.

2. J.W. convoys normally start from Clyde and are escorted by ships of the Home Fleet augmented as necessary by escort carriers and escorts from Western Approaches, the whole escort being normally under an Escort Commander of flag rank. It is the usual practice for an R.A. convoy to sail from North Russia approximately two or three days after the arrival of a J.W. convoy. The same escorts are therefore available for both convoys.
3. On arrival off Kola Inlet a J.W. convoy is met by a local expert, usually a Russian, and is then split into two parts, the Murmansk and White Sea sections. Normally the through escort continues with the former. The latter is escorted during the final stages mainly by the local escort, who are similarly responsible for escorting homeward bound ships back from the White Sea to Kola Inlet to join up with R.A. convoys.

Article 9001

Strategical Conditions

Conditions are very different from those obtaining in ocean convoys in the following respects:-

(a)     Long hours of darkness in winter and daylight in summer.

(b)     The possible variation in route is small, especially when the ice edge prevents passage north of Bear Island.

(c)     U-Boats are operating near their bases and can be so disposed that the chances of evasion are small.

(d)     The route involves passing within easy reach of bases of enemy surface forces and enemy shore-based aircraft. While the threat from these is now appreciably reduced, the surface threat may still necessitate the provision of surface covering forces for the convoys.

Article 9004

U-Boat Strategy

A patrol line of U-Boats is usually maintained to the westward of Bear Island. The area of this patrol appears to vary according to the extent of air activity by Coastal Command. But is kept as far to the south-westward as the enemy consider prudent, so that U-Boats can operate against the outward bound convoy for the maximum period.

2. As soon as an outward bound convoy is reported either by aircraft reconnaissance or by his U-Boat patrol line, all available U-Boats from the Arctic flotilla proceed from their bases to operate against the convoy.

Article 9006

Escort Organisation

For reasons of endurance, Fleet destroyers which form part of the escort of J.W. convoys normally join the convoy in approximate latitude 62° N., having completed with fuel in the Faeroes. If available a local escort is provided from Western Approaches to reinforce the through escort between port of sailing and the rendezvous. Any battleships, cruisers or escort carriers proceeding with the convoy normally also join in the latitude.

2. A minimum of one tanker sails in each J.W. and R.A. convoy, so that escorts may top up with fuel on passage. In emergency escort carriers may also be used to fuel escorts.

Article 9007

Routeing

The convoy routes are promulgated to all escorts and authorities concerned by Commander-in Chief, Home Fleet. The Escort Commander is authorised to make deviations from the route as he considers necessary. W/T silence should not be broken on these occasions unless such deviations are large or are likely to affect other forces in the area.

2. Deviations from the ordered route may also be initiated by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet. If the Commander-0in-Chief, Home Fleet is at sea he will signal the name of the authority who will be deputising for him is this respect. An authority, other than the Escort Commander, ordering a major alteration of route will request Admiralty to broadcast a B.A.M.S. message giving the new route for the benefit of stragglers.

3. Every opportunity of informing Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet (or the officer conducting the operation) of the position of the convoy is to be taken. On each occasion of breaking W/T silence, or when the convoy is sighted by the enemy, the position of the convoy should be signalled. It is equally important for surface or air escorts who leave the convoy to make a similar report when they are well clear, giving the last known position of the convoy. The importance of this cannot be overstressed as the conduct of the operation and movements of covering forces largely depend on the speed made good by the convoy.

Article 9010

Conduct of Surface escorts

The conduct of surface escorts is to be generally in accordance with C.B. 04234 (44) (2) (Admiralty Convoy Instructions) and C.B. 4097 (Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations) adapted as necessary by the following paragraphs and the Escort Commander’s operation orders.

Article 9011

Fuel

All escorting forces are to report daily at 1200 to the Escort Commander the amount in tons of usable fuel oil remaining (including diesel oil if any); number of days at economical speed remaining; number of depth charges remaining. Reports are to be made in the following form (=272-6-23=). Economical speed is to be taken as meaning 10 knots for corvettes and 12 knots for all other escorts.

2. Oilers fitted for buoyant hose method will normally accompany the convoy. Ships will be ordered to fuel as necessary by the Escort Commander, adjacent ships automatically adjusting their position on the screen as required.

Article 9012

Surface Action

With reference to C.B. 04234 (44) (2), Article 116, the term “covering force” in connection with North Russian Convoys, will refer to cruiser, carrier or battleship forces which are covering the convoy but are not in company with it. In the event of surface action appearing imminent the Escort Commander, by means of a codeword, will order the escorts to concentrate. Carriers will normally operate on the disengaged side and will carry out air strikes as ordered by the Escort Commander. Escort vessels should remain in close support of the convoy.

2. In the event of a North Russian Convoy being attacked by an overwhelmingly superior force the primary object of the Fleet section of the escort (destroyers and above) is to ensure that the enemy is shadowed so that he may be brought to action by our covering forces or may be attacked after dark or under more favourable conditions by the escort itself. To this end any possible delaying action is to be taken which may at the same time contribute to the safety of the convoy but contact with the enemy must not be lost.

Note: Experience has shown that in the event of a surface attack on the convoy the enemy will probably withdraw his U-Boats clear of the area.

Article 9013

Testing of Close Range Weapons

In view of the low temperatures experienced in these waters, it is especially important that close range weapons should be tested daily. This may be done at commanding officer’s discretion, the appropriate signal from Mersigs being flown (Blue flag is not to be hoisted).

Article 9014

Asdic Conditions

Owing to temperature layers, asdic conditions in these northern waters have often found to be very bad, and experienced escort groups which have had success in the Atlantic have frequently reported this fact when escorting North Russian convoys. Cases have often occurred of a U-Boat torpedoing a ship and completely escaping detection both before and after the attack.

Experience has also shown that echoes can often be obtained from surface craft while a submerged u-Boat remains undetected.

SECTION B

OPERATION – AIR ESCORTS

Article 9200

Conduct of Air Escorts

The conduct of air escorts is to be generally in accordance with C.B. 04234 (44) (3) (Admiralty Convoy Instructions) and C.B. 4097 (Conduct of Anti-U-Boat Operations) qualified as necessary by the following paragraphs and the Escorts Commander’s operation orders.

Shore based air escort is provided as far north as possible by 18 Group Coastal Command depending on the U-Boat situation and other commitments in the area.

Escort carriers will operate as far as possible inside the close screen. If for any reason it becomes necessary for them to proceed outside the screen, the two nearest destroyers are to attend on them without further orders.

It is emphasised that evasion is the primary method of achieving the object, viz., the safe arrival of the convoy. On numerous occasions the presence and position of the convoy have been given away by the sighting by a U-Boat of carrier borne aircraft.

(a) Up to the time that the convoy has definitely been located complete silence is to be maintained on aircraft waves until it become necessary to direct aircraft.

(b) The main requirement in this period is to avoid the convoy being sighted and reported. The controlling C.V.E. should therefore maintain at immediate readiness during daylight hours fighters for the destruction of enemy reconnaissance aircraft and an air strike for the destruction of any U-Boat sighted or detected.

When it is evident that the convoy has been reported, the air objective becomes that of the early location and destruction of U-Boats concentrating on the convoy. During this phase, air searches to be flown and degrees of readiness of air strikes will be as ordered by the Escort Commander. Relaxation of silence on aircraft waves is then permissible for enemy reports by search aircraft and for direction of aircraft by controlling C.V.E., but even then transmission should be reduced to a minimum.

Article 9202

Enemy Air Attack

If a formation of enemy aircraft is reported approaching the convoy, all fighter aircraft will be ordered, by means of a code word, to be flown up and form up over the convoy, the controlling C.V.E. taking on the duties of fighter direction unless otherwise ordered by the Escort Commander.

Article 9203

Enemy Surface Attack

1.        On sighting an enemy surface unit, aircraft are to report and shadow.

2.        C.V.E’s are to be prepared to carry out a combined bombing and fighter strafing attack on enemy surface units.

Article 9205

Controlling C.V.E.

C.V.E.’s will normally take 12 hour tricks as controlling C.V.E., the duties of which are laid down in A.C.I., Article 226.

In the testing flying conditions that obtain in the Arctic, it is more than ever important that flying personnel should be given every opportunity to rest.

SECTION C – COMMUNICATIONS

Article 9400

W/T Watch

1.   W/T watch is to be kept in accordance with Admiralty Convoy Instructions, General Communications Section, Article 302. In addition TBS will be manned as ordered by the Escort Commander, and the following guards are to be detailed:-

500 kc/s                   Commercial Wave
210 kc/s                   Fleet Wave
1,570 kc/s                When within 300 miles of Iceland
4,172 kc/s                North Russian Port Wave. See paragraph c below.
G.A. Routines          When H.D. reception is unreliable east of 25° East

RAF Group. Reconnaissance frequencies as requisite when aircraft are co-operating.

Russian Fighter frequency (4,000 kc/s R/T) as requisite.

(a)  In key to table to General Communications Section, Article 302, L represents Broadcast H.D. Unless ordered to shift to Broadcast B.N., watch on H.D. is to be maintained throughout, but a guard on B.N. is to be detailed while in Area B. Ships detailed as W/T guards need only read general H.D. periods. One ship, however, must keep continuous H.D.

(b)     Unless otherwise ordered, H/F D/F reporting wave will be 2,012 kc/s R/T.

(c) As reception of North Russian Port Wave in Northern latitudes is normally good, arrangements have been made with Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia, to broadcast on the frequency and messages originating in North Russia, which it is important that ships operating in Northern waters should receive with the minimum of delay, in addition to routeing them in the normal manner. In order to avoid delay in reception of messages from North Russia routed via United Kingdom W/T Stations, a guard on North Russian Port Wave is to be set when north of 65° North and east of 5° West, or before if this frequency appears likely to be of benefit earlier. These transmissions on North Russia Port Wave if made during daylight, will also be repeated at night.

   2. Fleet Wave – In the event of surface attack or on being detached from the convoy, destroyers and above are to set watch on Fleet Wave.

   3.   Harbour W/T Organisation is to be assumed at the Point of Arrival (K.I.G.M. 3 (a)).

Flotilla Leaders and above                         H.D. and Port Wave
Destroyers and below                                Port Wave

Article 9401

W/T Silence

1. It is vitally important that ships escorting convoys to North Russia and also ships taking part in the covering operations should maintain W/T silence until the enemy is aware of the position of the convoy. W/T state Zebra includes silence on V.H/F.

2. Owing to ice the route of the convoys cannot easily be varied, and one D/F bearing obtained by the enemy will give a comparatively accurate position.

3. It is valueless to break W/T silence to report navigational ice, or weather difficulties, or straggling. It is better that additional escorts do not make contact at all or escorts not rejoin than to break W/T silence.

4. Every opportunity should, however, be taken to report the position, course and speed of the convoy by V/S to an aircraft.

5. Escorts that leave the convoy should not break W/T silence to report their E.T.A. or other details while in the vicinity of the convoy, but wait until well clear. On arrival in harbour they should report the last known position, course and speed of the convoy, together with information regarding stragglers, if any.

6. Once it is certain that the convoy has been sighted by aircraft or U-boats, W/T silence should be relaxed and the opportunity taken to give a position, course and speed and weather report (AFO S2, Article 94), but strict W/T and Radar silence should be reimposed if, through fog or other causes, the enemy appear to lose touch.

When silence is broken on the convoy R/T wave, the senior officer should take early opportunity of broadcasting the position of the convoy for the benefit of those ships intercepting the R/T signals but not being in V/S touch (e.g. covering forces). One or more ships should be controlled to repeat back the R/T message to give a greater chance of interception.

The position is to be given as a bearing and distance from the last lettered position through which the convoy has passed. On no account must the next lettered position through which the convoy will pass be used.

It is also of particular importance that the volume of W/T traffic in areas connected with North Russia convoys should not increase shortly before the sailing of a convoy. This applies particularly to Skaalefiord where escorts often assemble before joining the convoy and where messages should always, if possible, be sent ashore by hand for transmission by L/T. It also applies to Kola, where a sudden increase in W/T traffic would be very marked.

Article 9402

Control of H/F D/F Reporting Wave

With the large number of H/F D/F fitted ships available, control on the H/F D/F reporting wave is essential. This will be exercised by the senior officer or ship detailed. When silence is relaxed the first ship with a bearing signal ready for transmission is to pass it to the controlling ship. Subsequent to this, ships will be controlled to pass in bearing signals by the controlling ship and no such signals (as a result of the same transmission) are to be made unless controlled to do so. Thus, although many ships may obtain a bearing on the same transmission, only the ship which is first with her report and those subsequently controlled will transmit their bearing signals of the particular enemy transmission to the controlling ship.

Article 9405

Enemy Reports

Enemy reports of surface craft are to be made on the convoy R/T wave and in the normal manner, i.e. Fleet wave and to a shore station.

It is emphasised that once the presence of the enemy surface craft is established, Fleet wave signals should be made on full power.

Article 9406

Protection from Air Attack in North Russian Area

1. Help messages (AFO S2, Article 180) are to be made on North Russian Port wave by direct method.

2. Ships may be requested by British W/T stations or by R/T from Russian fighters for homing signals. Homing signals are to consist of convoy W/T call sign and long dash made on 500 kc/s.

3. The Russian R/T frequency is 4,150 kc/s.

Call signs: Ship KARABLE
Fighter SAMOLYOT

Article 9408

Communication Orders for Russian Destroyers

1. The Russian destroyer in which the British Liaison Officer is embarked will be provided with sufficient V/S and W/T ratings to keep constant watch.

2. The above destroyer will set watch on the |Port Wave one hour before sailing. Transmissions by W/T may only be made in emergency, or when the enemy has been sighted. At all other times strict W/T silence will be maintained on all waves.

3. The following Call Signs and Distinguishing Signals are allocated for use by Russian destroyers:-

Call Sign Distinguishing Signal
UJR Senior Officer 89 Pendants International

For other Russian destroyers International Call Signs are to be used, vide Para 5.

Call signs and Distinguishing Signals of the British ships concerned will be supplied to the British ratings in the Russian destroyer.

4.The following publications are carried in Russian ships with British Liaison Officers:-

(i)             Naval Code and Decode
(ii)                 Area 1 Dangerous Water Tables
(iii)                A.V.S.B.
(iv)               Extract of D.G.s and call signs
(v)                 Extract of recoding tables for D.G.s sufficient to cover period at sea.
(vi)               Extract of lettered co-ordinates
(vii)              Mersigs
(viii)            Operating Signals
(ix)                Extract Pendant List
(x)                  Distress messages from page XI of Fleet Code

5.The following International Call Sign letters have been allocated to Soviet vessels in North Russian waters:-

Battleship

Archangelsk RMFC

Cruiser

Murmansk RMLQ

Flotilla Leader

Baku                                                  RMLB

Destroyers

Razumny                                             RMLT

Razyarenny                                         RMLC

Gremyaschi                                         RMCT

Gromki                                               RMDS

Grozni                                                RMEP

Zharky                                             RMRN

Zhguchi                                              RMRO

Zhyvuchi                                             RMRP

Zhostky                                               RMRQ

Derzky                                                RMRR

Doblestny                                            RMRT

Dostoiny                                              RMRU

Kuibyshev                                            RMDC

Uritski                                                  RMDO

Karl Liebnecht                                      RMBL

Minesweepers

111                                                                                                            RMFV

112                                                                                                           RMGM

113                                                             RMLK

115                                                        RMQW

116                                                        RMSR

117                                                        RMVQ

119                                                             RMXT

All large submarine chasers                    RMGD

Article 9409

Recognition

Anglo-Soviet Recognition will be brought into force by signals by order of the Escort Commander on crossing longitude of 15° East.

SECTION D – INFORMATION – SURFACE AND AIR

Article 9600

Enemy Information

Before convoys sail, Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet will issue to the surface escort available information regarding enemy forces and dispositions.

Enemy Airfields – Enemy airfields, from which aircraft operate against North Russian convoys are as follows:-

BANAK

BILLEFJORD (Float planes)

BARDUFOSS

TRONDHEIM

TROMSO (Float planes)

Enemy Submarine Bases – Enemy submarine bases are at:-

TRONDHEIM )

NARVIK ) Main bases

TROMSO Advanced base

Enemy surface forces which may operate against these convoys will probably do so from the Altenfiord area or Narvik.

Meteorological flights are often flown. Details of regular flights may be found in Supplementary Naval Intelligence Papers (C.B. 03121)

Approximate strength of enemy aircraft in Norway is also published periodically in S.N.I.P.s.

Article 9602

Russian Forces

1. Russian Aircraft -

(a) Following reconnaissance flights are flown by D.B.3’s, Catalinas, or Bostons flying singly or in pairs.

(i) Daily in area bounded by lines joining Kildin Island, Bear Island, position 75° N, 35° E. – Kildin Island

(ii) To locate convoy – to the eastward of 35°E. These aircraft have instructions not to break W/T silence.

(b) Fighter Escort may be expected,

(i) By Hurricanes, Airocobras, Jaks and Kittyhawks within 60 miles of Kildin Island.

(ii) By P.E.3’s, Hurricanes and Jaks in approaches to and through the White Sea.

2. Russian Submarine Patrol Areas –

(a) Following are the permanent operational areas established by Soviet Navy for Russian submarines.

[Note: Details of these areas have not been reproduced here, but are in original document]

( c) When Home Fleet ships are operating off North Norway, it has been the custom to request the Russian authorities to change the Western limit of submarine areas as necessary to keep clear of our operations.

Article 9603

Instructions to Russian Destroyers

The following instructions have been issued to the Russian destroyers employed on escort duties and are promulgated for information and necessary action:-

(1)           The Russian Destroyers joining the escort of an R.A. convoy will be provided with “Form AA”, which gives all details of routes, position on screen, etc. Destroyers are to join up with convoy in the vicinity of Toros Island.

(2)           Before the sailing of each R.A. convoy, a conference for the Commanding Officers of each of the ships forming the escort will be held by the Escort Commander. The most convenient time will probably be immediately after the convoy conference. It is important that the Commanding Officers of the Russian destroyers attend this meeting.

(3)          The Russian destroyers proceeding so as to join the escort of a J.W. convoy will be provided with “Form BB”. The rendezvous position selected will be consistent with the destroyers meeting the convoy during daylight and will be the anticipated “Furthest On” position of the convoy at that time.

(4)           If on reaching the rendezvous position the J.W. convoy is not met, the destroyers are to proceed along the convoy’s reciprocal course until dark when they are to turn to the same course as the convoy, carrying out a wide zig-zag and keeping their speed of advance as near as possible to that of the convoy. At daylight the next day, in the absence of other orders, course is again to be reversed and speed increased, when the convoy should be met.

(5)           If the convoy is still not met after 24 hours search, the destroyers are to proceed to the arrival point (MZ, MU, MX or MY as indicated on “Form BB”) and there await the convoy or further orders.

(6)           The Senior Russian destroyer will be provided with the following British Naval Staff:

Liaison Officer

Interpreter

3 or 4 Signalmem

3 or 4 Telegraphists

(7)           On meeting the J.W. convoy the Escort Commander will signal which positions on the screen are to be occupied.

(8)           Should an attack develop on the convoy the destroyers are to act in accordance with the following instructions, unless otherwise ordered:-

(a)     Air Attack – Close in to the convoy so as to give close support, bring the maximum armament into action but taking every precaution not to endanger any other ship in the escort or convoy.

(b)     U-Boat Attack – If the U-Boat is on the surface and can be seen, the destroyers are to attack at once, keeping the Escort Commander informed by signal. If the U-Boat is not seen, destroyers are to close the convoy, keeping clear of the other ships of the escort who will carry out a hunt. (This restriction will only remain in force until the Russian destroyers are fitted with Asdics.) In the event of a ship being damaged or sunk one of the Russian destroyers is to stand by her and act as a rescue ship, providing assistance and picking up survivors, while the other destroyer affords protection by circling the disabled vessel. If, however, the Russian destroyer is the first ship to detect the presence of a U-Boat by hydrophone, she has freedom of action to attack at once, but it must be remembered that the indiscriminate dropping of depth charges may ruin the chances of asdic fitted ships carrying out a successful hunt and attack.

(c)     Attack by surface forces – Escort Commander will decide what action is to be taken and destroyers should be prepared to proceed at high speed, to lay smoke screen and/or counter attack.

(9)           On return to harbour it would be helpful if Commanding Officers of Russian destroyers inform the Escort Commander of any difficulties experienced or any items of particular interest which had occurred.

Article 9605

Navigational Positions

The following positions have been established – all bearings and distances from Cape TERIBERSKI:-

MU 014° 34.5 miles

MX 032° 18.5 miles

MY 342° 9.0 miles

MZ 000° 20.0 miles

Article 9608

Routeing Instructions

All merchant ships are issued with all necessary navigational information for the voyage, including instructions to stragglers, dangerous areas and instructions for entering Loch Ewe, Kirkwall, Faroes, Seidisfiord, Akureyri, Reykjavik, Kola Inlet, Iokanka, Archangel and White Sea Ports.

Article 9609

Instructions to Stragglers

J.W. Convoys –

(i) When still south of 61° N return to Loch Ewe or Kirkwall (if nearer).

(ii) Between 61° N and 67° N return to THORSHAVN (Faeroes).

(iii) When north of 67°N and west of 10° E return to Akureyri.

(iv) When east of 10° E continue to Iokanka.

R.A. Convoys –

(i) When still east of 25° E return to Iokanka.

(ii) When west of 25° E and north of 61° N proceed to Thorshavn (Faeroes).

(iii) When south of 61° N proceed to Loch Ewe or Kirkwall (if nearer)..

Note – No stragglers’ route is provided for owing to the lack of sea room and the reference positions given to all ships are identical with the standard route.

SECTION E - REPORTS REQUIRED

(Note – In addition to the reports enumerated in C.B. 04234 (44) (6) (Admiralty Convoy Instructions), the following are also required.)

Article 9800

Meteorological Data and Ice Reports

There is little meteorological information concerning the high latitudes in which these convoys run. Any meteorological data therefore which can be forwarded is of great value.

The position of the ice edge determines largely the convoy route and any information concerning the position of the ice at any time is important.

Information should be included in Reports of Proceedings.

Article 9802

Reports of Proceedings

Reports of Proceedings, when necessary, should be forwarded by individual ships to the Escort Commander, who will forward a full report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

Article 9805

Ammunition

In order that replenishment of ammunition expended during the outward passage (particularly by escorts) may be effected as soon as possible after arrival in North Russian ports the following procedure is to be used:-

As soon as W/T silence on Port Wave can be broken, the Escort Commander should report to Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia (via Polyarnoe W/T Station), the essential requirements for the replenishment of escorts’ ammunition, omitting minor deficiencies. Only the number of rounds, calibre and mark of gun and nature of ammunition need be signalled as other details of ships’ armaments are held by the shore authorities concerned.

Article 9806

Oiling at Sea

Home Fleet ships should forward the report called for by Home Fleet General Order 97.

Article 9807

Firing on Russian Aircraft

In the event of ships firing on Russian aircraft due to mistaken identity it is important a brief report of the circumstances should be signalled to Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia, at the first suitable opportunity. The report should state –

(a) Whether or not the aircraft employed correct recognition procedure; and

(b) Whether or not the aircraft’s approach was suggestive of attack.