Date of Arrival

Place

Date of Departure

Orders, Remarks etc

1.1.42

Scapa

4.1.42

8.1.42

PQ8 (8 ships) sailed from Hvalfjord escorted by HARRIER (Lt Commander E P Hinton) and Speedwell (Lt Commander J J Youngs), arriving Murmansk 17/1. The convoy sailed in the arctic darkness with just a pale daylight at noon. HARRIER zigzagged ahead while Speedwell brought up the rear.).

17.1.42

17/1 Convoy PQ8 was joined by eastern local escort of Hazard and Sharpshooter despite the thick fog that kept Britomart and Salamander in Kola.

At 1945 on 17/1 Harmatris was hit by a torpedo from U454 which passed underneath HARRIER. Speedwell was ordered to drop back and stand by the stationary Harmatris. An hour later a second torpedo hit Harmatris but failed to explode, the captain thought he had hit a mine. Speedwell was ordered alongside to evacuate some of Harmatris’s crew. After much effort a towing wire was passed but Speedwell was unable to move her as the starboard anchor had let go when the torpedo struck and stuck fast.

At 2200, as Sharpshooter had joined the screen, the destroyer Matabele was sent back to Harmatris. U454 fired another salvo of torpedoes which missed their target, a tanker, but hit Matabele. Although about 60 of the 200 crew escaped alive many were killed by the destroyer’s own depth charges and the cold.  
 

On the afternoon of 16th January 1942, all was well with Convoy PQ9, some bad weather and the occasional 'Ping'. We were not far from the Kola Inlet and safety. It was my first voyage to North Russia. With only two Tribal Class destroyers and two fleet sweepers we were not much protection for the convoy.

My oppo pointed to a strange cloud formation, "Looks like a destroyer" he said, "that means one of them will cop it". We all immediately dismissed this as "Rubbish". In the evening a merchant ship was damaged by a torpedo and Matabele was soon there to ascertain the damage. She signalled "Should be able to make harbour".

In the early hours of the 17th my warm cocoon of a hammock was shattered by a large explosion, together with the ship's alarm bells sounding "Action Stations". When I reached the upper deck Matabele was broken in two and the bows and stern were pointing skywards. A few desperate cries were heard as we stopped to lower our whaler and scrambling nets.

The first man the whaler approached called out in a calm parade voice, "Don't stop for me - some of my men are in real trouble over there, pick me up on your way back". This was a brave act of self-sacrifice, we all knew you lasted only a couple of minutes in that sea. The unknown hero was never to be seen again, and we managed to pick up only three from the sea. The rest would have gone straight down with the ship.

The men that we saved were smothered in oil fuel and although it was terrible to have it in your lungs, no doubt it gave them a precious few moments to survive the savage cold.

It was said that Matabele had towed the merchant ship for a while, and then kept a close eye on her and so, when expecting further trouble, switched on her searchlight to investigate, making a perfect target for the U-boat.

Source: John Eldred, Ordinary Seaman, HMS Harrier - Chris Tye, The Real Cold War

HARRIER raced in to try and pick up survivors. Her task was difficult and harrowing, for the icy wind bringing the temperature to 30 degrees below freezing produced a thin swirl of fog which froze like hoar frost. The decks were by now a mass of ice and lowering the rescue boat with the ropes and pulleys frozen solid was a tough and exhausting task. When eventually the boat was lowered the crew rowed towards the disaster area in the darkness. Here they found the sea covered with a thick layer of oil fuel spilled out from the destroyer’s tanks. Steering through the debris, they were just able to distinguish numbers of men in their life jackets, floating upright but quite dead. As the crew rowed on they found the surface littered with men in this gruesome state, victims of the explosions and the freezing water. Approaching they found the oil so thick they could hardly move the boat. The oars were dipping into a mass of thick sludge and getting them nowhere.

Not far away they heard men calling for help but it was impossible to go further. From somewhere behind them they heard a chorus of feint shouts. Spurred on by the cries they went astern and within minutes found three men together and still alive. They were enveloped in thick oil and the task of hauling them aboard was formidable for they were much too weak to help themselves and in their slippery condition it was difficult to find a handhold.

Eventually the crew pulled back to the HARRIER and there the survivors were embarked, which was only accomplished after scrambling nets had been lowered and heaving lines passed round the chests of the three men who were by now almost unconscious. By the time they had been carried into the wardroom for medical attention all three had passed out. An hour later one was found to be dead but the other two recovered.  (Bill Burras and Ernie Higgins).

Source: Last Call for HMS Edinburgh – Frank Pearce

18.1.42

The volunteer crew withdrew from Harmatris to Speedwell and she circled the freighter all night. At 0600 with both ships alone in the ocean the crew went back to Harmatris and slipped the anchor chain, reconnected the tow wire and at 0800 got under way again. They were now joined by Sharpshooter and Hazard. At noon, a Heinkel He111 made a half hearted low level attack but was driven off by the AA armaments of the minesweepers and the DEMS gunners on Harmatris. A second plane dropped her bombs a mile away.

At about 14.30 a high pressure steam pipe on Speedwell burst, badly scalding three men and Youngs signalled for a Soviet tug, which arrived within the hour. Speedwell left at speed to seek medical assistance for her injured crew members. Two further tugs arrived and Harmatris got to Murmansk early on 20/1.

Source: Extracts from Arctic Convoys by Richard Woodman
 

18.1.42

Murmansk

Report of SBNO North Russia

24.1.42

At sea

HARRIER and Speedwell form part of eastern local escort for QP6 (6 ships) from 24/1 until 25/1. Bramble and Hebe joined on 25/1 and remained until 28/1 when the convoy dispersed.

1.2.42

At sea

4.2.42

HMS HARRIER, Speedwell and Hazard carried out sweeping operations between Svyatol Nos and Cape Gorodetski. No mines swept.

22.2.42

HARRIER, Hazard and Salamander local eastern escort to PQ11 (13 ships)

1.3.42

At sea

HARRIER and Sharpshooter provide eastern local escort for QP8 from 1^st until dawn on 3^rd March as far west as 30°E. The ocean escort included Hazard (Senior Officer, Escort) and Salamander.

10.3.42

HMS HARRIER (SO M/F 6), HMS SPEEDWELL, HMS HUSSAR, HMS SHARPSHOOTER sail pm 10^th March to rendezvous convoy during daylight 11^th March.

11.3.42

At sea

12.3.42

HARRIER, Hussar and Speedwell joined PQ12 (17 ships) as eastern local escort arriving Murmansk 12/3. Although Tirpitz searched for the convoy, PQ12 arrived unmolested.

21.3.42

At sea

Gossamer, Hussar, HARRIER, Niger and Speedwell provided Eastern local escort for QP9 until 23/3. Ocean escort included Britomart and Sharpshooter.

28.3.42

PQ13 endured the full Arctic repertory of foul weather, and attacks by enemy ships, submarines and aircraft... The Eastern Local Escort consisting of the minesweepers Gossamer, HARRIER, Hussar, Speedwell had left Kola on 28th March to bring the convoy in and look for survivors and stragglers.

That evening Trinidad had to stop with salt in the boiler feed water. The wind died, a full moon and a brilliant aurora lit up Trinidad as a perfect target. She was only 70 miles from the Kola Inlet. She managed to get going again and arrived at Kola on 30/3.  

Source: ADM 199/347- Report of the Local Escort

From    The Senior Officer, Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla

Date    9th April 1942                              No. F.02/26

To       The Commander in Chief, Home Fleet

Convoy PQ13

The following narrative of local escort while meeting PQ13 is submitted. All times are zone minus three:- 

1.    Before leaving harbour, it was known that Convoy PQ13 was widely scattered owing to gales and that S.S. "HARPALION" had been bombed.

2.    H.M.Ships "HARRIER", "GOSSAMER", "SPEEDWELL" and "HUSSAR" sailed at 1900 through position MU to 37ºE, carrying out an A/S patrol en route.

3.    At 2118 H.M.S."HUSSAR", who was keeping guard on 500 k/cs, reported that the S.S."EMPIRE RANGER" was sinking in position 72º 13'N 32º 10ºE. As "EMPIRE RANGER" was apparently just ahead of the convoy and, apart from other escorts in the vicinity of the convoy, H.M.S."ORIBI" and two Russian destroyers from the Kola Inlet were already on their way to join the convoy, it was decided that no useful purpose could be served by detaching one of the Minesweepers (who at the time were 180 miles away from the position in which "EMPIRE RANGER" had been torpedoed).
 

29.3.42

4.    Altered course at 0400 to North up longitude 37ºE. At 0500 "SPEEDWELL" was detached with orders to patrol between positions B and Q and to escort the ships into Kola Inlet. If she met either "RIVER AFTON" or "EMPIRE COWPER", she was to embark two officers and one rating, to avoid their being incarcerated by the Russians, as had been the experience a little before of three officers. It transpired later, however, that one officer and the rating had sailed in the "EMPIRE RANGER" and were, presumably, taken prisoner. The officer from "EMPIRE COWPER" was collected by H.M.S."GOSSAMER" on return to Murmansk.  

5.    At 0645 a report was received of three German Destroyers in position 71º 10'N, 31º 30'E at 2200 on 28th.

6.    At 0600 and again at 0625, a Junkers 88 was sighted by "SPEEDWELL" in the vicinity of position B and at 0730 a Junkers 88 circled "HARRIER", "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR".

7.    "HARRIER", "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR" were to patrol latitude of 37º E between positions E and U; one of them was to be detached to escort any unescorted stragglers met, returning to their patrol after reaching Kola Inlet.

8.    At 0632 orders were received from The Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia that a minesweeper was to be detached to look for boats from "EMPIRE RANGER" who had reported by W/T before abandoning ship that they were making for the coast. As this (Immediate) signal took nearly 12 hours to reach me and as by that time there were three enemy Destroyers between the position of sinking and the coast and it was known the H.M.S."ORIBI" and the two Russian destroyers were near the position, I replied that it was not proposed to detach a Minesweeper (the Minesweepers being some 120 miles away). At 0825 orders were received from The Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia to comply with his original signal, and accordingly "HARRIER" was detailed and in latitude 71º 25' N at 0945 she increased to full speed and steered up the convoy route in the hope of getting news of "EMPIRE RANGER's" boats from any of the convoy or escorts met.

9.    At 1054 signals were received which indicated a fight between H.M.Ships "TRINIDAD", "FURY" and "ECLIPSE" and the enemy Destroyers. Later one enemy Destroyer was reported stopped near the position where "EMPIRE RANGER" was sunk.

10.    At 1045 "HARRIER" encountered ice in latitude 71º 39'N. This proved to be thick brash and "HARRIER" worked round to the Westward and later to the South-Westward with some difficulty. The extent of the ice was reported by W/T to The Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia and to all escorts: also my intention of proceeding to escort H.M.S."TRINIDAD" (who had reported that she had been torpedoed and was about 50 miles to the North West of "HARRIER's" estimated position) and the position, course and speed of S.S."HARPALION" who was met about that time.

11.    H.M.S."HUSSAR", who with H.M.S."GOSSAMER" had been left to patrol the 37º meridian, sighted a submarine on the surface at 1046, which was lost sight of shortly afterwards in a snow squall. At 11.48 "GOSSAMER" obtained an Asdic contact on what was quite probably the same U-boat. Both ships carried out deliberate attacks and it appears highly probable the the U-boat was destroyed.

12.    At 1335 "GOSSAMER" detached "HUSSAR" to join "TRINIDAD" and remained in the vicinity of the submarine till dark, when she resumed patrol south of the ice.

13.    H.M.S."SPEEDWELL", patrolling between positions B and U, had attempted to intercept S.S."HARPALION" at position B but did not see her. The next morning she left her patrol line in an endeavour to escort "TRINIDAD", but in the very bad visibility failed to make contact.

14.    At 1625/29th "HARRIER" detected a ship by R.D.F. at a range of 11,000yards in a heavy snowstorm and shortly afterwards caught a glimpse of H.M.S."FURY" who was escorting "TRINIDAD". "HARRIER" was at first stationed on the beam of "TRINIDAD" to check her speed (estimated then as 11 knots) and her compass. "TRINIDAD" was then steering from aft and by magnetic compass. As "TRINIDAD''s" steering appeared a little erratic, "HARRIER" took station ahead of her to make good her course without zigzagging, while "ORIBI" and "FURY" screened her on either bow.

15.    At 1750 course was altered to 190º to make Kilbin North Bight. It was arranged that W/T silence should not be broken to ask for D/F Beacons and that the "HARRIER" should lead "TRINIDAD" into Kola Inlet by using R.D.F. if necessary.
 

30.3.42

16.    From about 0500 of 30th March the wind increased to Force 8 and visibility was frequently nil owing to snowstorms. "TRINIDAD's" speed varied from a maximum of 14 knots to a minimum of 4 during the night. "FURY", whose R.D.F. was out of action, lost touch at about midnight and "HARRIER" was unable to detect her by R.D.F. and therefore unable to lead "TRINIDAD" over to "FURY" as had been ordered by "TRINIDAD".

        At about 0500, "TRINIDAD's" speed was 4-5 knots and for half an hour or so "ORIBI" and "HARRIER" carried out an endless chain patrol around her. 

17.    At 0752 "TRINIDAD" broached to and told "HARRIER" to try to get a wire in to her. By the time "HARRIER" had turned and got back to her, however, "TRINIDAD" was able to resume her course. Tugs, all available A/S escorts and fighter cover were asked for by W/T, as "TRINIDAD" had great difficulty in keeping steam.

18.    0800. Made Kildin Island. Entrance to Kola Inlet was obscured by snowstorms and "HARRIER" passed in positions obtained by R.D.F.

19.    At 12.00 when inside Kola Inlet "HARRIER" and "ORIBI" resumed patrol, making for position Q. They were joined at 1500 by "SPEEDWELL".

         "ORIBI" informed me by signal that he had found "EMPIRE RANGER's" boats at 0840/29th in position 72º 00' N 31º 11'E,  showing every sign that the occupants had abandoned them. There were food, drink and blankets in the boats, so it appears that the men were picked up by some other ship. As no ship in the convoy or escort has since reported having picked them up, as German Destroyers were in the vicinity and as the German wireless has claimed prisoners from a merchant ship, their fate appears obvious.

20.    At 0550 "GOSSAMER" had intercepted the signal giving "TRINIDAD's" position, course and speed and, having no merchant ships in sight, altered to the Westward to join her.  

21.    At 0745the visibility in her vicinity had cleared to 7 miles and "GOSSAMER" sighted a submarine on the surface almost 5 miles ahead and three merchant ships at extreme visibility on her starboard quarter. "GOSSAMER" chased the submarine at full speed but the submarine drew away and, after half an hour's chase, "GOSSAMER" shaped a course to join the merchantmen. These ships were "SCOTTISH AMERICAN", "EFFINGHAM" and "DUNBOYNE". 

22.    At 1020 "GOSSAMER" received instruction from The Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia to proceed immediately to the assistance of "INDUNA", torpedoed in position 70º 55'N 37º 18'E. Search by daylight and during the night proved ineffective, and patrol was resumed the next morning.

23.    ?045 "HUSSAR", not having succeeded in making contact with "TRINIDAD", came up with 9 ships of PQ13 and the Whaler ????? escorted by two Russian destroyers (without Asdics) ??????? A/S trawler (whose A/S was out of action). She escorted ?????? Kola Inlet and, as the Acting Commodore in "SCOTTISH ??????" had no charts of the Inlet, led them to Bolshoi Oleni ?????? where they arrived at 2130. When off Toros Island an ?????? aircraft dropped bombs; there were no hits. At 2200 ?????? resumed patrol.

24.    1900 "ORIBI" sighted a Whaler ahead, roughly in Position  ?????? "HARRIER" and "SPEEDWELL" closed the Whaler who proved to be Silja and was wallowing, without fuel in a sea 54. "ORIBI" ????? to the assistance of "RIVER AFTON" who had reported ??????? by a U-boat.

25.    While "HARRIER" was getting "SILJA" in tow, "SPEEDWELL" patrolled round the two ships to provide an A/S screen and then ?????? ahead when "HARRIER" with "SILJA" in tow made good ?????? and speed of 5 knots. The wind was then North- ??????, Force 7, almost astern.
 

31.3.42

26.    "HUSSAR" joined at 0230 and screened astern. Kola Inlet ???? at 08.30 again in very bad visibility owing to snow. "SPEEDWELL" had by then lost touch, and "HUSSAR" was ordered ???? patrol through positions Q and B.

27.    10.10 "HARRIER" anchored off the South-East entrance to ?????? Harbour and got "SILJA" alongside to give her 5 tons ????? "HARRIER" making good an engine defect and repairing ?????.

28.    The Captain of the "SILJA" told me that when the "BALLOT" ?????, her Master told him to take off half the crew. ?????? wisely said he would do so, provided they came by boat, ???? were an odd collection and the situation had the makings ????? stampede. "SILJA" later transferred these 40 or so med ????? "INDUNA" who was herself sunk. Survivors from "INDUNA" ????? (who reached harbour safely) have since been picked ????? inshore, by Russian patrols.

29.    1230 "SPEEDWELL", who had been patrolling in the vicinity of the entrance to the Inlet, hove to in sight, and at 1245, tugs ????? taken over "SILJA", "HARRIER" and "SPEEDWELL" set a course ???? intending to proceed on the reciprocal course to that on ???? the main body of the convoy had approached the evening ????? it being known that "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR" were ???? between positions Q and B and the ice limit south of U.

30.    1650 an object was sighted by "SPEEDWELL" (who was on ????? port bow 7 cables) bearing North. The investigation ?????? to be a red sail. The Master, Chief Officer, two ???? Officers and thirteen men from the American S.S. "EFFINGHAM" ?????? picked up by "HARRIER". From them it was learnt that their ????? had been torpedoed in Position 70º 28'N 35º 44'E at 1100.

        This information, and the "HARRIER" and "SPEEDWELL" were searching for a second boat from the "EFFINGHAM", was passed by W/T to The Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia. This signal crossed one from the Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia ordering all minesweepers to return to harbour and fuel unless in company with a merchant ship. The search was continued until 0740 of 1st April in generally good conditions of visibility. It was then abandoned, as I considered that the missing boat, if still afloat, must be inshore. It was subsequently learned that the second boat was picked up in the Kola Inlet p.m. 31st and that the 14 occupants are doing well.

        When picked up after 32 hours, the survivors from the "EFFINGHAM" were, with one exception, in remarkably good fettle. I was particularly impressed by the bearing of the Chief Officer and have forwarded a recommendation for him through the Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia. They had buried five men (having previously removed their clothes for their own use) not long before we sighted them, and one of their company, in spite of the unremitting efforts of Surgeon Lieutenant Ian Mankelly, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and of Henry J Woodward, L.S.B.A. C/MX52544, died two hours after being brought onboard and was buried at sea that night, a funeral service having been conducted in the Sick Bay. Most of the survivors were suffering from frostbite and were a bit restless, and the Doctor and the L.S.B.A. tended them throughout the night. This is by no means the first occasion on which this officer and this rating have worked tirelessly, cheerfully and with undoubted skill under trying conditions.   
 

1.4.42

31.    "GOSSAMER" and "HUSSAR" returned to harbour a.m. and "HARRIER" and "SPEEDWELL" p.m. 1st April, "NIGER", who had been boiler-cleaning and repairing Gyro Compass sailed a.m. to search for the Whaler "SULLA". At 1045 she saw three torpedoes approaching an the surface from the port quarter. Two were going to pass ahead, but the third which was expected to pass astern was zigzagging, and the necessary avoiding action was taken. "NIGER" proceeded at full speed down the torpedo tracks. a good contact was obtained on the Starboard bow and a counter attack was made. By a great misfortune, "NIGER'S" Asdic Dome was leaking slightly, with the result that echoes went woolly within 20º on either bow. Nevertheless the attacks carried out were good and may have damaged the submarine, since they were made in broad daylight and the submarine's original firing position was definitely established at the end of the torpedo tracks which were very plain in a calm flat sea. A search was carried out for several hours afterwards and no further contact was obtained. 

32.    Having failed to find "SULLA", "NIGER" returned to harbour p.m. 3rd April.

33.    Convoy PQ13, the Ocean Escort and the Covering Force had a strenuous time indeed, competing as they did with gales, surface, submarine, and air attack, ice and frequent snowstorms (although the last mentioned were probably an advantage at times), and the way in which they won through is worthy of admiration.

34.    At the same time I submit that, to a much lesser degree and for a much shorter period, the Local Escort had a non-stop performance and I would like to pay tribute to the way in which Officers and men of H.M.Ships "HARRIER", "NIGER", "GOSSAMER", "SPEEDWELL" AND "HUSSAR" carried out their duties on this occasion. The receipt of the following signal kindly sent by The Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia on return to harbour was greatly appreciated by all ships:-

M.S.6                                                                   From S.B.N.O., N.R.

I should like Commanding Officers of all Minesweepers to know that I fully appreciate the good work in the difficult conditions in the past few days searching, escorting, and hunting under the nose of the enemy sea and air forces. It does everyone, but especially the Engine room department, great credit that all ships have been ready for service whenever called upon and I am sure that valuable lives and ships have been saved by the good work performed.   

                                                                    1742A/1

                                    Commander
            Senior Officer, Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla
 

Extract from ADM 199/1104 Report of SBNO North Russia March 1942

I wish to pay tribute to the recent work of the Minesweeping Flotilla, consisting of HMS HARRIER (Senior Officer), Niger, Gossamer, Speedwell and Hussar, under the command of Commander E P Hinton, DSO, MVC, Senior Officer, 6th Minesweeping Flotilla. These ships have been escorting QP and PQ Convoys in most severe weather conditions and expected every form of attack be the enemy at distances up to 300 miles from the base. They have little rest except when cleaning boilers, and can seldom berth alongside or obtain relaxation. Their work, especially when meeting convoy PQ13, has been extremely well done and reflects credit on all concerned. 

Signed N Bevan

Rear Admiral, Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia 
Polyarnoe, 1942
 

Source: ADM 1/14713 Request for payment of climate pay to minesweepers serving in North Russian waters.

From:     The Senior Officer, Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla

 

Date:      3^rd May 1942

 

To:        The Rear Admiral (Destroyers), Home Fleet

Copy to: The Senior Officer, First Minesweeping Flotilla

 

Hard Lying Money

 

1.                         It is submitted that in view of the uncomfortable and unhealthy living conditions which are experienced in HM Ships of the Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla, consideration may be given to the granting, as a permanent measure, of Hard Lying Money at the full rate for these ships.

 

2.                         The increase in complement beyond the numbers for which these ships were originally designed, by the addition of specialist ratings for Asdic operation and in some cases for RDF, has led to a condition in the messes of extreme overcrowding. It is now impossible in HMS HARRIER for instance, for all the members of the same messes to sit down to a meal together, and a system of feeding in relays is the only alternative to a proportion of the ratings eating their meals standing up or in corners, owing to lack of table space. In addition, there is room only for 75% of the ship’s company to sling their hammocks; for the remainder the only spaces available are benches and tables, and this is a serious disadvantage at sea in a ship which is naturally ‘lively’.

 

3.                         The discomfort of this congestion are not mitigated by the considerable ‘sweating’ on the mess decks when ships are at sea. Upper deck ratings have regularly come off watch during the winter with extremely cold hands, faces and feet into a tepid and humid atmosphere and the water drips steadily onto their hammocks, bedding and gear and on to the mess decks.

 

4.                         These conditions are aggravated while the Flotilla is employed in North Russia, in the case of some ships for over three months at a stretch. Although ships have first been fitted out for Arctic service and the warm clothing supplied has been excellent, conditions in North Russia have been very severe; apart from an occasional visit to a cinema and a little skiing, the amenities ashore have been virtually non-existent with the result that ship’s companies have been thrown almost entirely upon their own resources to amuse themselves on board.

 

5.                         In spite of this, the general standard of behaviour has been very high and the normal atmosphere of cheerfulness has not deteriorated; this it is submitted is all the more reason why favourable consideration should be given to the matter.

 

6.                         It is understood that similar conditions obtain in HM Ships of the First Minesweeping Flotilla.

 

                                 (Signed) E P HINTON

                                             Commander

                     Senior Officer, Sixth Minesweeping Flotilla

10.4.42

HARRIER, Hussar and Gossamer formed part of the Eastern local escort for QP10 (16 ships) as far as 30°E on 12/4. Speedwell was part of the Ocean escort. The convoy was heavily attacked by aircraft and submarines during the first few days.

18.4.42

Niger, Hussar, Gossamer and HARRIER joined PQ14 as eastern local escort and a strong gale from the north-west sprang up. The convoy arrived Murmansk 19/4 where there were persistent air attacks.

28.4.42

Niger, Hussar, Gossamer and HARRIER joined QP11 (13 ships) from Murmansk as eastern local escort until 29/4. They escorted the convoy for the first 300 miles and then returned to Murmansk.

Murmansk

29.4.42

Intend to sail HARRIER from Scapa with QP12. HARRIER due for refit.

23/5 Arrangements have been made for refit of HARRIER to be carried out by Humber Shipwright Co, Hull

30.4.42

On the evening of 30/4 HARRIER had just completed re-fuelling from a tanker in the Kola Inlet, when a signal was received informing HARRIER that Edinburgh had been torpedoed by a U-boat. 

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/ww2/A2076518

HMS EDINBURGH By Brodnax Moore - As published in Warship World Vol 3 No8 Autumn 1990 (This story was written by  Brodnax Moore’s father David Moore, Navigating Officer on board HMS HARRIER)

In the minesweepers our expectation of a warm night in harbour rapidly disappeared as we were ordered to proceed to sea again at full speed to find and assist the stricken cruiser. Our captain in the HARRIER, Commander Eric Hinton, took all this in his stride. He was a fine seaman, expert in ship handling. Beneath his unassuming and humorous manner, there was an irreducible core of courage. The minesweepers were never intended to engage enemy surface ships, but we ail knew that our Captain would never entertain the thought of running away, even from a German battleship. My job as Flotilla Navigating Officer was not only to navigate HARRIER and the sweepers under our command, but to act generally as the Captain's staff officer in organising any operations on which our flotilla was engaged.

At 2018 on 30 April, four hours after the Edinburgh had been struck, we passed outwards from Kola Inlet and began to retrace our course along the convoy’s track towards Edinburgh's reported position, which we naturally assumed might in the circumstances be considerably in error.
 

1.5.42

By midday on 1 May we were near this position, still searching to the northward with Gossamer and Niger spread out to the westward to obtain the maximum width of radar coverage. Hussar was following somewhere astern escorting a Russian tug to the scene. That evening we ran into the edge of the ice pack and were forced to turn back to the south. In doing so we spread our search line to the eastward and by great good luck we sighted Hussar soon after midnight (it was twilight all night) and she told us that she had just found Edinburgh. Visibility was now varying from about one to five miles because of continual snowstorms. [Moore]

Following the torpedoing of HMS Edinburgh by U456, Niger, Hussar, Gossamer and HARRIER were sent to reinforce the protective screen of destroyers while the Russian tug Rubin took her in tow. Just before midnight with the sun touching the horizon and immediately rising again, the minesweepers hove into sight. It was found that the tug could not tow the big ship on her own, so two tows were secured. Rubin on the port and Gossamer on the port quarter. Even so, they could only make 2 knots. Edinburgh signalled to the minesweepers that ...'in the event of attack by German destroyers...(they)...are to act independently, retiring under smoke screens as necessary'.

2.5.42

By 0530 with the destroyers Forester and Foresight on either beam and HARRIER, Niger and Hussar astern, Edinburgh proceeded steadily. Intermittent snow showers varied the visibility from two to eight miles. 

At 0627 Hussar, on Edinburgh’s starboard quarter, came under fire from three German destroyers trying to close through the fog on Edinburgh. Hussar took up the challenge with a spirited and gallant resistance to the enemy. She immediately opened fire with her 4 inch gun. Fire was returned immediately, straddling the tiny sweeper which, outgunned and outmanoeuvred, fell back towards the two British destroyers.  

Immediately HARRIER and the two destroyers swung round and headed towards the gun flashes. 

Moore:

I was half asleep in the charthouse when I heard a shout from Lieutenant Holgate, who was our Officer-of-the-Watch, to come up to the Bridge immediately. Going up the ladder I was thinking 'My god, this is it'- expecting to see the German battleship Tirpitz, which was stationed in Northern Norway and might well have been sent to finish off the damaged British cruiser. In fact it was a German Z-class destroyer, and her initial salvoes were straddling Hussar, who, like HARRIER, was between Edinburgh and the German attackers. The time was 0627. 

Admiral Bonham-Carter had signalled the Senior Officer 6th Minesweeping Flotilla previously that, in the event of meeting enemy surface forces, the sweepers were to retire under a smoke screen. Either we never received this signal or Cdr Hinton kept it to himself and chose to ignore it. At any rate, he immediately turned HARRIER straight towards the German destroyer, increased to our full speed of 14 knots and opened fire with our single 4 in gun, We obtained one range of the destroyer of four miles, but our radar then went out of action with the vibration of the gunfire. Soon three German destroyers came in sight intermittently, dodging in and out of the snowstorms, and making smoke that increased the haze. Edinburgh opened fire with the three 6 inch guns in her "B" turret, which was practically the only one of her four turrets still able to fire. Foresight and Forester came dashing over from the other side of the flagship and began to engage the Germans, who kept their distance at four or five miles and refrained from approaching any closer.
Seeing gun-flashes coming from five separate directions, the Germans probably imagined that they were confronting a superior force. Each of these heavy destroyers was armed (we subsequently discovered) with five 5.9 in guns in addition to torpedoes, so had they pressed in they might easily have sunk every ship in our force. However, HARRIER and the other 'fleet' minesweepers looked not unlike destroyers when seen end-on, so probably the Captain's action in heading straight for the enemy had saved our lives.

Minutes later a 4-gun salvo of shells fell 500 yards from us, another straddled our forecastle and then another fell at the correct range just astern, but fortunately we were not hit. Hussar was also engaging the enemy. The action continued, with the Germans disappearing from view from time to time, until 0652 when we sighted ahead a torpedo, apparently running on or near the surface in the direction of Edinburgh. 

These aggressive tactics by the destroyers and 3 minesweepers kept them at bay. Edinburgh ordered Gossamer to cast off and, steaming in circles out of control, opened fire, hitting one of the German ships. Gossamer and HARRIER closed in on Hussar and Edinburgh, their Asdics searching for submarines. Unfortunately at 0730 a German torpedo attack on one of the British destroyers missed but went on to hit Edinburgh. With both of the destroyers badly damaged, time and again the minesweepers darted forward firing their guns. Admiral Bonham Carter described the minesweepers actions as ‘like three young terriers, going in and firing when they could’. Almost unbelievably the minesweepers’ valiant action in the cloud and flame of battle led the enemy to suppose they were destroyers arriving to supplement the British force and probably restrained them from mounting further attacks. In reality there was nothing but the small group of minesweepers to stop the Germans from annihilating every British ship opposing them.   

Edinburgh was listing at 17 degrees and starting to settle. With Hussar making a smoke screen, Gossamer was ordered along the starboard side to take off the wounded and merchant navy personnel being taken home. The transfer of the wounded from a sloping deck onto the minesweeper’s deck 12 feet below was a difficult task. The passengers included many Poles released from Russian prisoner of war camps, army and RAF instructors, and Czechs who had been interned in Russia. She embarked 440 officers and men while Edinburgh continued firing at the German ships. 

 
Photos of HMS HARRIER alongside HMS Edinburgh

At 0800 the order to abandon ship was given and the remaining 350 crew were transferred to HARRIER on the port side. Captain Hinton and the crew of HARRIER showed remarkable calmness for the minesweeper was in danger of being crushed as Edinburgh increased her list. He signalled to Edinburgh ‘You are leaning on me rather heavily’. Meanwhile the tug Rubin came rushing in and unfortunately collided with HARRIER with a resounding crack, causing little damage.  

Aboard both minesweepers the decks were becoming so overcrowded there was imminent danger of the vessels capsizing. Although the men were asked to go below to stabilise the vessel a large number were reluctant to do so. It was understandable in the circumstances, especially for those who had recently been trapped below decks. Edinburgh’s First Lieutenant called on the men to follow him and led the way as far down as it was possible to go. Finally, Rear Admiral Bonham Carter hoisted his flag on HARRIER.

Moore:

HARRIER had now become the Admiral's flagship, and it was necessary to hoist the appropriate flag designating a Rear-Admiral. The nearest we had was a white flag with a red cross, but two red balls needed to be added to complete it correctly. I instructed my Yeoman to improvise these with the red ink from the charthouse, and the flag was duly hoisted.

Admiral Bonham-Carter was a jovial character, but with exceptionally sound tactical judgment and shrewd common-sense. He was imperturbable in this misfortune, but was now faced with the embarrassing fact that the Edinburgh, despite the colossal damage caused by the three torpedoes, obstinately refused to sink. HARRIER was ordered to encourage the process and fired twenty 4 in shells into the ship at point-blank range, but these had little effect. We then steamed close alongside firing depth charges set to explode at the shallowest possible depth. One of these actually rolled down the side of the ship and went off immediately underneath her, but still without result. Bonham-Carter began to think of going back on board with a skeleton crew when the Foresight re-appeared form the murk, having finally driven off the Germans. She was asked: 'Have you any torpedoes left?' - to which she replied: 'One'. It so happened that this torpedo had misfired when Foresight had fired her entire outfit at the enemy.

The Admiral now ordered the destroyer to sink the Edinburgh with her remaining torpedo, and we watched her position herself at point-blank range (1500 yards) abeam of the cruiser and saw the torpedo dive into the sea. There followed the longest two minutes that I can remember, towards the end of which the Admiral was saying: 'She's missed': but just at this moment the torpedo struck and exploded, and we witnessed the sad end of this fine cruiser as she rolled over and sank. 

The laden sweepers, with the Rubin and the damaged destroyers Foresight and Forester, set course for Kola Inlet.

On the way back Cdr Hinton pointed out with some pride to the Admiral how we had correctly improvised his flag with the red balls and hoisted it, to which Stuart Bonham Carter's reply was: 'Two balls! That's more than I expected to have this afternoon!’

2.5.42

At 1020 Niger, which had been detached in the night to locate and bring in the two refuelled Russian destroyers, rejoined. 

Moore:

We made our way back to Murmansk, and as we got further from the scene of action without any more interference from the enemy, our spirits rose. The sun actually appeared through the clouds, and I was able to make observations with the sextant. Cdr Honnywill, the admiral's Staff Navigating Officer, worked out the sights for me, and I still have his calculations written on the back of the Admiralty signal informing convoy QP11 that it was being shadowed by a U-boat. These sun sights enabled us to fix the position of HARRIER fairly accurately during the afternoon of 2 May, and we made a good landfall and safely entered the Kola Inlet at 2040 on that day, some 12 hours after the Edinburgh had sunk. Our 'chicks' - the Niger, Hussar and Gossamer - were with us. Foresight and Forester also got back unmolested, but they had both sustained damage and casualties. Between them and Edinburgh there was a total of 74 killed and 43 wounded in this action, but all the minesweepers had escaped unscathed. It transpired later that one of the German destroyers had been scuttled after sustaining heavy damage, and that the other two had retired at high speed after rescuing the crew. 

HARRIER, Gossamer, Hussar, Niger and the other ships arrived at Kola. Edinburgh’s survivors were disembarked at Polyarnoe where they were split into two groups with one group being re-embarked on Gossamer for Vaenga. The minesweepers stopped at Vaenga to refuel from the Russians. There was no interpreter and one of Harrier's officers Lt Christopher McLean was brought a paper to sign as receipt for the oil. This he did but the Russian official was dissatisfied and by signs made it clear that he must have a rubber stamp. Very tired and with somewhat frayed nerves from the last three days' ordeal, McLean took the only rubber stamp then available bearing the word 'Cancelled' and stamped the receipt. The Russian went away happy.

Soon after arriving at Murmansk, HARRIER’s Commanding Officer received the following letter from the captain of the Russian tug Rubin, which was greatly appreciated by everyone: 

From Commander of Divisions, U S S R Gunboat Rubin 4th Day of May 1942 

Dear Sir,

Soviet seaman has witness of heroic battle English seaman with predominants powers of enemy. English seamen did observe their sacred duty before Fatherland. We are prouding to staunchness and courage of British seamens – our Allies. I am very sorry what injured your ship by approach to board for what I must beg pardon.

Commander of Division 

Disembarking at Murmansk, Admiral Bonham Carter sent the following message to the captain and crew of HARRIER:

...it was inspiring to see the minesweepers staying on the scene of action and taking every opportunity of firing at the enemy when visibility permitted. The manner in which HARRIER and Gossamer were brought alongside the listing Edinburgh during the action showed a fine feat of seamanship and I fully confirm the Commanding Officer of Edinburgh’s report of the way we were treated on board. Never have I seen more kindness and attention than was given to myself, Captain, officers and men than by the Captain, officers and ship’s company of HARRIER in which we left. 

A day or two after arriving in the Kola Inlet, HARRIER entertained Rear Admiral Bonham-Carter in the small wardroom. Christopher McLean recalls that at the end of the evening he thanked them very much for their hospitality and for all the help they had given in the Edinburgh action. He had no way of reciprocating but wondered whether they had ever seen an admiral stand on his head. This he proceeded to do much to the delight and astonishment of his audience.

Source: ADM116/4544 Convoys to Russia March to May 1942

AWARDS

Commander Eric Perceval Hinton DSO MVO RN Senior Officer 6th MSF HMS HARRIER.

During the action in which HMS Edinburgh was sunk, Commander Hinton without the slightest hesitation led his small ships into action against the more heavily armed attacking force and engaged the enemy wherever possible. When ordered to bring his ship alongside HMS Edinburgh, then heavily listing, while the action was still in progress, he handled his ship with great skill and coolness despite the possibility of the Edinburgh rolling on the HARRIER at any time. 

For outstanding courage, cheerfulness and devotion to duty while engaging superior enemy forces.

DSC - Lt Frederic Bradley RNVR 

DSM - LSBA (Ty) Henry John Woodward C/MX 52344

DSM - AB Edward Swan C/J 109583

DSM - ERA1 Philip Edward Robinson C/M 8008

Mention in Despatches:

Lt John Douglas David Moore RN 

Surgeon Lt Ian Miskelly LRCP 

Lt Donald Wilcock Holgate MA RNVR 

Signalman John William Ferguson C/JX 211219

A/CPO Alfred Edward Roberts C/JX 136574

Leading Steward (Ty) Frank Colman C/LX 26185

Stoker 1 Raymond George Newman C/KX 144418

AB Christopher Douglas Giles C/SS 11813

21.5.42

Eastern Local Escort for QP12 (17 ships) until 23/5 comprised Bramble, Gossamer, Leda, Seagull and two Russian Destroyers. HARRIER was part of the Ocean escort arriving Reykjavik 29/5. Although relatively unmolested, one attack by Ju88’s was deflected by a Hurricane launched from the CAM ship Empire Morn. One was shot down but the pilot of the Hurricane, Flying Officer John Kendal, was killed when his parachute failed to open properly when he abandoned his spent aircraft. Thick fog prevented any U boats making contact with the convoy.
 

28.5.42

Iceland

31.5.42

3.6.42

Scapa

4.6.42

6.6.42