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|
HMS Gossamer
|
Date of Arrival |
Place |
Date of Departure |
Orders,
Remarks etc |
|
2.1.41 |
Harwich |
6.1.41 |
|
|
7.1.41 |
Harwich |
7.1.41 |
|
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8.1.41 |
Harwich |
9.1.41 |
|
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10.1.41 |
Harwich |
12.1.41 |
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12.1.41 |
Harwich |
12.1.41 |
|
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13.1.41 |
Harwich |
14.1.41 |
|
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14.1.41 |
Harwich |
19.1.41 |
14/1 From F O i/c
Harwich: Fitzroy damaged by near miss from acoustic mine at present in
tow by GOSSAMER with St Mellons proceeding to take over tow |
|
20.1.41 |
Harwich |
23.1.41 |
|
|
23.1.41 |
Source: ADM 199/1173 HMS
GOSSAMER Report of attack by enemy aircraft 23.1.41
REPORT OF ATTACK BY ENEMY AIRCRAFT
Name of ship:
HMS GOSSAMER
Date of attack: 23.1.41
Position: 51˚56’N,
01˚28’30
E
Course: 102˚
Speed 15 knots
Weather: Misty, Cloud 2,000 feet, light wind
Visibility: One mile at sea level increasing with height
Number of
aircraft attacking: One ME110
Direction of
attack: Starboard beam
Number of
bombs: Two released at 1,000 feet
Estimated
size of bombs: 250 lbs, impact
Position in
which bombs fell: 150 yards port beam
Damage to
ship: None
Casualties:
None
Gunfire used:
Long range
controlled: Two rounds from after gun as aircraft crossed astern
and turned to attack, range 2-3,000
Barrage Fire: Barrage fire was ordered but dive was completed
before 1st round was ready
Close range weapons: .5 machine gun, range 2,000 – 1,000
Damage to
aircraft: Not known. The .5 machine gun may have secured hits.
General
remarks:
Aircraft was
sighted off the port bow on opposite course at about 2,000 feet. The
wheel was put hard aport to keep both guns bearing. The aircraft
turned to attack from the starboard quarter. The wheel was reversed
and the attack was delivered from the starboard beam. The bombs fell
about where the ship would have been if the turn to port had been
continued. The 0.5” machine gun opened fire as the aircraft started
his dive – the fire appeared to be accurate and may have prevented
the attack being pressed home. Machine gun fire from the aircraft
was mostly over, one bullet mark was found on the quarterdeck
screen.
The aircraft
was later shot down in the Straits of Dover by British fighters (C
in C Nore 1137/24)
A Jay
Lieutenant Commander
|
|
23.1.41 |
Harwich |
25.1.41 |
|
|
? |
Harwich |
28.1.41 |
|
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28.1.41 |
Harwich |
31.1.41 |
|
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1.2.41 |
Harwich |
2.2.41 |
|
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2.2.41 |
Harwich |
3.2.41 |
|
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3.2.41 |
Harwich |
3.2.41 |
|
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4.2.41 |
Harwich |
4.2.41 |
|
|
6.2.41 |
Able Seaman William John
Price P/JX 174186 died aged 22. |
|
? |
Harwich |
11.2.41 |
|
|
12.2.41 |
Harwich |
12.2.41 |
|
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13.2.41 |
Harwich |
15.2.41 |
|
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16.2.41 |
Harwich |
18.2.41 |
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21.2.41 |
Scapa |
30.3.41 |
|
|
30.3.41 |
Aberdeen |
7.4.41 |
|
|
9.4.41 |
Greenock |
14.4.41 |
|
|
18.4.41 |
Iceland |
? |
26/4 From SO 6th
MSF: GOSSAMER’s Degaussing coil requires renewal and she has sustained
weather damage. Ship beached alongside quay Stornoway to enable space
between frames to be cemented. Consider ship should dock before next
escort duty. Propose floating dock, Aberdeen
27/4 From C in C W A:
Approved for Salamander and GOSSAMER to proceed Aberdeen |
|
? |
Stornoway |
28.4.41 |
|
|
29.4.41 |
Aberdeen |
15.5.41 |
30/4 from N O i/c
Aberdeen: GOSSAMER has been taken in hand for damage repairs by A C
Hall and Co, Aberdeen, anticipate completion 14/5. Boiler cleaning and
half yearly being undertaken concurrently |
|
16.5.41 |
Greenock |
17.5.41 |
|
|
? |
Loch Fyne |
17.5.41 |
|
|
? |
Stornoway |
30.5.41 |
|
|
7.6.41 |
Stornoway |
9.6.41 |
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10.6.41 |
Aberdeen |
16.6.41 |
|
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17.6.41 |
Stornoway |
18.6.41 |
29/6 GOSSAMER to sail to
Grimsby for refit |
|
2.7.41 |
Humber |
22.8.41 |
3/7 From Captain Grimsby
Base: Date of completion 9/8. Fitting SA Gear will extend date to
16/8. Internal DG by 30/8.
28/7 completes 16/8 |
|
25.8.41 |
Londonderry |
26.8.41 |
|
|
29.8.41 |
Londonderry |
8.9.41 |
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|
8.9.41 |
Belfast |
9.9.41 |
|
|
11.9.41 |
Milford Haven |
? |
|
|
14.9.41 |
Belfast |
22.9.41 |
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25.9.41 |
Iceland |
29.9.41 |
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29.9.41 |
At sea |
11.10.41 |
Britomart, GOSSAMER, Leda
and Hussar were part of the Ocean escort for PQ1, with Harrier joining
as the local eastern escort on 10th and 11th
Oct. to Archangel. No enemy action. |
|
22.10.41 |
|
|
The
approach to
Archangel
over the bar of the River Dvina is followed by 24 miles of narrow and
very tortuous channel. Navigation is done entirely on shore transits
as no buoy mooring can stand up to the ice. The North Dvina Light-ship
is removed in winter for the same reason. When the river is free of
ice it is a two hour trip for fleet minesweepers.
We
encountered the first sheet of ice on 22nd October. This
was some 3 inches thick. We nosed our way through it with infinite
care, thinking ourselves to be some sort of Shackletons. However a
Norwegian officer serving in one of our ships told us, correctly, that
this was nothing. So we took to charging through it contemptuously at
our full 14 knots.
Source
ADM 199/2112 |
|
25.10.41 |
|
|
By 25th
October the ice was a little thicker and more widespread. Our changing
tactics merely led to one engine, and often both, having to be stopped
because the condenser inlets were choked by ice. Some tense moments
resulted among the hairpin bends. The ice was not, at this stage,
thick enough to stop the ship provided one engine could be kept
running (to have both going simultaneously was a very rare
occurrence). “Bogey” for the 24 mile course had now risen to about
five hours.
Source
ADM 199/2112 |
|
|
At sea |
30.10.41 |
PQ2 GOSSAMER, Hussar and Leda
joined from their base in Archangel to provide local eastern escort on
29th and 30th October. The convoy was not
attacked |
|
11.10.41 |
Archangel |
? |
Our
Engineer officers then got really busy, assisted by some professional
advice from the Russians, and the stage was reached where, more often
than not, they could keep both engines going provided we left the
revolutions to them. They used to give from six to eight knots. It was
about this time that the Gossamer and the Hussar tried to spend a
night alongside the Norfolk on the seaward and more ice-free part of
the river. Loose lumps of ice coming down with the tide piled up
between the ships, forcing their bows apart. Eventually six wires
parted simultaneously leaving the two minesweepers to drift down the
river.
Source ADM 199/2112 |
|
2.11.41 |
|
|
As the
ice got thicker we found that at some six to eight knots we frequently
stuck. Going astern and having butt at it usually enabled us to make
slow and jerky progress. When going astern failed to unstuck us, a
short burst of speed ahead was often effective, although this was
invariably followed by choked condensers. Another discovery we made
was that when butting through the ice, wheel and engines are often
quite ineffective in steering the ship. In spite of our best efforts,
the ship goes in the direction in which the ice breaks – usually
straight ahead.
To get
alongside a jetty also presented a new problem. Our bows would go in,
but all our efforts to coax our sterns alongside were thwarted by a
cushion of ice between ship and jetty. For this we eventually
discovered two effective solutions. One was to push the bow into the
jetty in the place where one eventually aspired to berth the stern. By
going ahead with wheel towards the jetty it was then possible to
scrape the jetty clear of ice for the ship’s length. The other, and
rather neater, solution was to approach the jetty stern first. By
moving engines ahead and astern one could gradually disperse the ice
with the wash of the propellers.
By 2nd
November a time had arrived when no amount of backing and filling or
of spurting could get us through the ice and assistance became
necessary. This took the form of tugs with blunt, shallow bows which
ride up on the ice until the weight of the tug breaks it. Their method
of procedure was to circle our ships (“breaking them out”) until the
ice had been loosened, when they would take station ahead for us to
follow them. The trouble about this was that, if we followed close the
lumps of ice forced down by their screws led to the continual choking
of our inlets, while if we kept our distance, the ice had time to
solidify and we frequently stuck. We always tried to make them tow us,
but this was obviously against their principles, possibly because from
time to time both ships would stick, which meant that they had to cast
off the tow and break us out again. Our best passages at this time
were accomplished when we could find a merchantman going in the same
direction as ourselves and were able to follow her at about five
cables. “Bogey” for the 24 miles had now risen to 48 hours.
One of
the disadvantages of ships being able to move only when within a
“lane” of broken ice is that these lanes are usually only wide enough
for a single ship. When two ships meet head on in the same lane
complete deadlock ensues as neither can give way. There is nothing to
do except to stay there until an icebreaker of some kind comes along
and widens the lane. This may not be for 24 hours or more. When in one
of these traffic blocks, particularly in 47 degrees of frost, one’s
instincts are to ring off and all go below to warm up. This, however,
is fatal. One must keep jogging ahead and astern, if it is only for a
quarter of a ship’s length, or within five minutes the ship will
completely frozen-in beyond all hope of escape.
Source
ADM 199/2112 |
|
3.11.41 |
|
|
On
morning of departure of QP2 ICARUS, ECLIPSE, BRAMBLE and GOSSAMER were
iced in at Brevennick and it took two icebreakers six hours to clear a
passage for ships into the main stream.
Source: ADM 199/624 |
|
4.11.41 |
|
|
The
ice became really thick by 4th November when even the
Russians admitted that a proper ice breaker was necessary. Accordingly
the celebrated Lenin appeared looking rather like a battle ship of the
Iron Duke class on a smaller scale. She certainly seemed to rush
through anything, leaving a wide lane in her wake. Her main employment
appeared to steam up and down so as to keep the main channel
sufficiently loose for merchantmen to move alone or with the help of
tugs. About this time we began to find it somewhat disconcerting to
have to use our sirens to remove people and even horses from the track
of our ship. It seemed strange to pass a market on the ice in full
swing only a few yards from us. Furthermore our tactics for getting
alongside a jetty no longer worked. The only recognised method now
appeared to be for the ship to stop some 15 yards from the jetty while
a tug dispersed the ice by steaming to and fro between the ship and
jetty. Even with the assistance of two tugs, however, we only managed
to get our stern in. This was our last attempt before we abandoned the
river on 13th November.
Source
ADM 199/2112 |
|
16.11.41 |
Murmansk |
? |
16/11GOSSAMER,
Hussar and Speedy arrived Kola Inlet
18/11GOSSAMER,
Hussar and Speedy sailed from Kola Inlet
GOSSAMER,
HUSSAR and SPEEDY were delayed sailing for minesweeping prior to
arrival of PQ3 for 36 hours owing to ice breakers not being provided
at the time promised. GOSSAMER and SPEEDY subsequently grounded on
the bar as Light Vessel had been removed without their knowledge. If
they had known they would have taken pilots.
Source: ADM 199/624
21/11 from
GOSSAMER: ETA North Dvina 22/11 |
|
22.11.41 |
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|
On 22nd
November we were leading a convoy towards Archangel at first light
when some five miles short of the bar there was a familiar scrunching
noise and we found ourselves in thick ice. This was something quite
new, but we eventually managed to extract ourselves and to anchor in
clear water to seawards. That night more ice drifted out of the river,
surrounded our ship and dragged us for 1 ˝ miles. Again we got out
successfully, but had to re-enter in order to fuel from a tanker,
alongside which we spent the night. The tanker had 90 fathoms of
cable, but when the morning came we found that the entire area of ice
had drifted no less than 20 miles, taking the tanker, the Gossamer and
several other craft with it.
Except
when trying to move about, we used to anchor even when surrounded by
ice. But this was probably unnecessary as the ice always held the ship
only too securely without assistance. Indeed, when the ice did decide
to drift, no amount of cable served to prevent dragging. Moreover as
the frost had cracked the cylinders of the capstan-engine we were
reduced to running the capstan by man power, and, in consequence, had
quite a struggle each time we weighed anchor. We shall not easily
forget the sight of our resourceful First Lieutenant on the forecastle
encouraging six seamen who were digging in the ice with axes and
shovels to make a hole through which he could raise the anchor.
Source
ADM 199/2112 |
|
27.11.41 |
At sea |
28.11.41 |
27/11 from
SBNO Archangel: Sail convoy any time before dark
GOSSAMER (?), Seagull and
Speedy met PQ4 (8 ships) 27/11 and escorted it into Archangel on
28/11. |
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Following damage has been sustained by ships due to ice and
limitations of ice breaker service:
BRAMBLE: Plates strained aft
causing leak into tiller flat
GOSSAMER: A/S 60% out of action
SPEEDY: A/S 100% out of action
and chipped propellers.
SEAGULL: Extension of damage to
fore peak; original damage was sustained in very bad weather on
passage from United Kingdom.
All ships sides show signs of slight corrugation and
all ships have suffered from choked condenser inlets continually.
The long sea time put in by all ships in bad weather,
long hours of darkness, and difficult navigation, throws a
considerable strain on Commanding Officers, especially with the
limited experience of the majority of their officers. It is
necessary if the ships are to continue to operate efficiently that
Commanding Officers should have adequate rest on return to harbour.
This they will not get if they are to be concerned
with possible damage to their ships, failure to fuel, and doubts as
to being ready for sea when required. Every one of my commanding
officers has said that they would rather be at sea continually than
return to the uncertainties, troubles and worries of Archangel.
ADM 199/624
Report of Captain Harvey Crombie Senior Officer 1st MSF,
HMS Bramble |
|
27.11.41 |
At sea |
10.12.41 |
GOSSAMER and Hussar
provide part of the Ocean escort for QP3 (10 ships) which left
Archangel on 27/11. On dispersal of the convoy, they escorted two
Russian ships to Kirkwall. No enemy activity. |
|
10.12.41 |
Scapa |
12.12.41 |
|
|
16.12.41 |
Sheerness |
16.12.41 |
|
|
16.12.41 |
London |
14.2.41 |
17/12 Taken in hand
Thames for repairs and fitting out for Arctic service, completes
29/1/42
9/1 From F O i/c London:
Completes 12/2 |
|
