Halcyon Class Minesweepers HMS Sphinx - Sinking
Report of Board of Enquiry
 
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Source: ADM 1/10785

 

Findings of the Board of Enquiry held at Royal Hotel, Invergordon on Saturday 10th February 1940 into loss of HMS SPHINX.

 

President: Captain G O Hewitt DSO, RN (Retd),

Members: Commander LG Addington DSC , RN (Rtd), Commander H de C Lamotte RN Retd  - all from HMS Flora.

     We find that:- 

1)   The loss of HMS SPHINX was due to enemy action, supplemented by subsequent extremely bad weather , in which nothing further could be done than was done.

2)   The excess of personnel, over the minimum required to work the ship, should have been disembarked early on February 3rd, but whilst expressing the above opinion they allow that the feeling of the responsible officers present that SPHINX would be towed into safety, together with the impossibility of handling the wounded and the danger of further damaging SPHINX by ships going alongside, may have justified their decision to retain entire crew on board.

3)   The large loss of life was due to the weather deteriorating so rapidly during the night, causing tow to part after several hours fairly easy towing, so making any question of ships remaining alongside each other for any period of time impossible. Every effort was made by all ships concerned to save life.

4)   Although bulkheads were not shored up, owing to the prepared material being lost with the fore part of the ship, this did not affect the final issue and every effort was made by officers and men of SPHINX to bring their ship to safety.

5)   The pumping of some 90 tons of ballast from a light draught  ship in very heavy weather was unwise, particularly in view of the fact that SPHINX did not appear to be making water below decks in any appreciable quantity, but was taking in heavy seas on deck.

6)   The handling of Confidential Books was performed with due consciousness of their importance by a young officer in very difficult circumstances. He received no orders to burn them, which order the Commanding Officer had promised to give later if necessary, and in consequence they were not dealt with as primarily laid down in CB Form U2D (1938).

7)   No books or documents as laid down in KR & AI, Article 461 could be produced owing to total loss of SPHINX.

8)   They desire to express their appreciation of the lucid report forwarded by Sub-Lieutenant Anthony Gerald William Bellars of SPHINX and to confirm the conduct of those persons mentioned in that report. 

The conduct of all persons taking part in the proceedings was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Service.

The Board wish to express the opinion that, though the fact was not brought out in evidence, later knowledge has revealed that the Confidential Books on board SPHINX may be compromised, since certain of them have been washed out of the wreck of their ship which is presently stranded on the coast of Scotland.

____________________

C in C Rosyth noted that:

Although all witnesses were questioned with regard to the state of readiness of the guns prior to SPHINX being bombed and the evidence indicated that the guns were not in fact manned, the Board failed to make this point in their finding. In my opinion it has a considerable bearing in the matter. If these guns had been manned as they should have been and had opened fire, it is fair to assume that they would have had a considerable effect on the accuracy of the enemy bombing and might well have  prevented the SPHINX being hit.

____________________

The following message was subsequently issued emphasising the need for all ships to keep armament in a fully efficient state:

    CAFO 935

The report of the Board of Enquiry into the loss of one of HM ships by enemy bombing attack has revealed that a contributory cause to that loss was that the failure to keep the armament in a fully efficient state and the anti-aircraft personnel adequately alert.

Experience of enemy air attacks indicates that, if fire is opened early the attacks will probably not be pressed home to the very short ranges which have to be reached in order to obtain a high probability of hitting with bombs. Consequently it is vital not only that guns’ crews and control parties should be fully alert but that arrangements should be made for barrage firing and close range weapons to be ready to open fire, if necessary in local control, as soon as an alarm is given.

The following points were brought out by the enquiry referred to:

a)     The attacking aircraft achieved complete surprise and were unopposed during the first attack, in which the ship was hit.

b)     There was insufficient personnel on deck to man fully even a proportion of the armament, and about three minutes elapsed between the dropping of the first bomb and the gun’s crews being closed up.

c)     There was a lack of decentralisation of authority to open fire after the alarms have been given.

d)     The state of maintenance of the armament was unsatisfactory in that:-

(i)         Close range weapons jammed after firing very few rounds

(ii)        Fuses of HE shell in the ready-use racks were not set for barrage fire and fuse-setting keys could not be found when the attack started. Fire was opened with unfused shell.

 

e)    Their Lordships  wish again to draw the attention of Commanding Officers to the importance of keeping a proportion of AA guns manned and fully alert whenever the operation on which the ship is engaged renders air attack possible and weather  conditions indicate that attacking aircraft are likely to be able to achieve surprise. Only by care and thoroughness in the training of personnel and in the proper maintenance of weapons and by unremitting alertness on the part of all officers and men can loss or damage to HM Ships and heavy casualties to personnel from air attack be guarded against.

     

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